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PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA BREACH HARMS
Ido Kilovaty*
Cybersecurity law, both in statutory and case law, is primarily
based on the premise that data breaches result exclusively in
financial harms. Intuitively, legal scholarship has largely focused
on financial harms to the exclusion of non-financial harms—
emotional and mental—that also arise from data breaches. A
critical mass of research in psychology, psychiatry, and internet
studies shows that consumers whose information has been
compromised suffer from serious emotional and mental conditions
as a result. This Article seeks to evaluate cybersecurity law in light
of this reality and proposes a framework to address these
psychological data breach harms.
Psychological data breach harms raise significant challenges
for which the law does not adequately account. Consumers suffering
these harms are unlikely to pursue litigation and, even if consumers
do pursue litigation, are unlikely to prevail because of both standing
and cause of action reasons. In a similar vein, different
cybersecurity law frameworks, such as the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, data security laws, data breach notification laws, and
Federal Trade Commission enforcement, do not generally recognize
harms that are non-monetary in nature. Moreover, companies
suffering data breaches are not legally required to offer any
assistance to, or mitigation response for, consumers who suffer
psychological harms. Contributing to these challenges is the fact
that breached companies are often not even required to disclose
breaches that are unlikely to cause future financial harm.
Cybersecurity law currently overlooks a conceptual framework
for psychological data breach harms; this Article offers that
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framework. First, this Article argues for the recognition of
psychological data breach harms in the context of cybersecurity
from the very outset. Second, this Article makes concrete
recommendations on how psychological data breach harms ought
to be addressed, both by regulators and breached entities, as well
as recommends the appropriate remedies. Finally, this Article calls
for a reconsideration of what “personal information” means and
for the expansion of information categories that cybersecurity law
should protect.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Data breaches happen more or less on a daily basis.1 Millions,2
and even billions,3 of compromised sensitive consumer records have

1
In 2019, there were 1,506 data breaches in the United States, with a total of
164 million records exposed. See Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed
Records in the United States from 2005 to 1st Half 2020, STATISTA (Aug. 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/data-breaches-recorded-in-the-unitedstates-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/
[https://perma.cc/LA5HSKUE].
2
Josh Fruhlinger, Equifax Data Breach FAQ: What Happened, Who Was
Affected, What Was the Impact?, CSO (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.csoonline.com/
article/3444488/equifax-data-breach-faq-what-happened-who-was-affectedwhat-was-the-impact.html [https://perma.cc/8MUJ-V38R] (narrating an overview of
the Equifax breach, affecting at least 143 million consumers).
3
Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected by 2013 Attack,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/
technology/yahoo-hack-3-billion-users.html
[https://perma.cc/RKZ6-WMD5]
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already affected the largest and most popular companies, as well as
their consumers.4 The impact of these breaches is often quantified in
monetary terms5 by focusing on either the damage caused to the
victim company or the individual financial harm suffered by the
victim company’s consumers. However, too often, the law and
policy on cybersecurity ignore the mental, emotional, and nonfinancial harms that consumers experience or may experience in the
future as a direct result of a data breach.6 This Article refers to these
harms collectively as “psychological data breach harms.”
While financial harms resulting from data breaches are surely
important, those harms have been the sole focus of cybersecurity
law to the exclusion of psychological data breach harms. The mental
and emotional impact on consumers has been increasingly studied
and documented in recent years.7 However, actual misuse of
(describing the Yahoo data breach which affected three billion users’ personal
information).
4
Dan Swinhoe, The 15 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO (Jan.
8, 2021), https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breachesof-the-21st-century.html [https://perma.cc/3Z2W-X3EF] (naming popular
companies who have been breached, including eBay, LinkedIn, Marriot, Adobe,
and others).
5
See generally Cost of a Data Breach Report 2020, IBM (July 2020),
https://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach
[https://perma.cc/3RGX-7SYY]
(calculating the average data breach cost at 3.86 million USD globally and 8.64
million USD in the United States).
6
See, e.g., Maria Bada & Jason R.C. Nurse, The Social and Psychological
Impact of Cyber-Attacks, in EMERGING CYBER THREATS AND COGNITIVE
VULNERABILITIES 73, 82 (Benson, McAlaney eds., 2020) (“Research indicates that
current forms of cyberattacks can cause psychological impact . . . Depending on
who the attackers and the victims are, the psychological effects of cyber threats may
even rival those of traditional terrorism . . . Victims of online attacks and crime can
suffer emotional trauma which can lead to depression. There is also some evidence
of limited symptoms of acute stress disorder (ASD) in victims of crime in online
virtual worlds, such as some anecdotal accounts of intrusive memories, emotional
numbing and upset from victims of virtual sexual assault . . . .”).
7
Id.; see also Michael L. Gross et al., The Psychological Effects of Cyber
Terrorism, 72 BULLETIN ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 284, 284 (2016) (arguing that
psychological effects of cyber threats can rival those of traditional terrorism);
Jessica Guynn, Anxiety, Depression and PTSD: The Hidden Epidemic of Data
Breaches and Cyber Crimes, USA TODAY (Feb. 24, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/conferences/2020/02/21/data-breach-tipsmental-health-toll-depression-anxiety/4763823002/
[https://perma.cc/69F2-
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compromised information is not always required in order for
consumers to experience psychological harm. Such misuse may
include doxing,8 cyberstalking,9 medical identity theft,10 disclosure
of sensitive information, and manipulation and microtargeting.11
These forms of misuse are not all recognized by existing law, and
cybersecurity law currently does not fully address psychological
data breach harms that victimized consumers undoubtedly
experience as a result of such misuse.
Cybersecurity law includes several smaller components that
seek to achieve different goals.12 Some of these goals include
LQSJ] (listing the many emotional and psychological consequences of data
breaches); Ioannis Agrafiotis et al., A Taxonomy of Cyber-Harms: Defining the
Impacts of Cyber-Attacks and Understanding How They Propagate, 4 J.
CYBERSECURITY 1, 7 (2018) (recognizing that, in the context of data breaches,
“Psychological harm (i.e. harm which focuses on an individual and their mental
well-being and psyche),” among other forms of harm, in the context of data
breaches); Eleanor Dallaway, #ISC2Congress: Cybercrime Victims Left
Depressed
and
Traumatized,
INFO.
SEC.
(Sep.
12,
2016),
https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/isc2congress-cybercrime-victims/
[https://perma.cc/ES64-8JWH] (observing that victims of data breaches are
experiencing trauma).
8
See Josh Fruhlinger, What Is Doxing? Weaponizing Personal Information,
CSO (Aug. 31, 2020), https://www.csoonline.com/article/3572910/what-isdoxing-weaponizing-personal-information.html [https://perma.cc/L896-S2UH]
(“The quickest route to finding and weaponizing personal information about a
target may be to simply buy it, whether from legal, if shady, data brokers or from
databases passed around on the dark web derived from the innumerable data
breaches that afflict companies large and small.”).
9
See Jim Reed, EE Data Breach ‘Led to Stalking’, BBC (Feb. 8, 2019),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46896329
[https://perma.cc/NX9CMMEE] (telling the story of a woman who was stalked by her ex-partner after he
accessed her personal data without permission).
10
See, e.g., Pam Dixon & John Emerson, The Geography of Medical Identity
Theft, WORLD PRIV. F. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_comments/2018/01/00037-142815.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/58Y2-25HP] (explaining the crime of medical identity theft and
impacts on the victims of the crime).
11
See, e.g., Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, 34 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 449, 453 (2019) (explaining phenomenon of online manipulation
through psychographic profiling).
12
See generally Orin Kerr, What is ‘Cybersecurity Law’?, WASH. POST (May
13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015
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preventing data breaches,13 compensating victims,14 penalizing
perpetrators,15 and increasing transparency.16 Throughout
cybersecurity law, psychological data breach harms have little to no
role to play. For example, computer crime law makes a computerrelated act a criminal offense only when the information involved,
or the damage done to a system, results in quantifiable financial or
physical harm but does not, however, include emotional or mental
harms in the definitions of “loss,”17 “damage,”18 or “value.”19
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), the primary
federal enforcement authority in data security,20 does not consider
consumers’ mental and emotional harms resulting from data
breaches to be an “injury.”21 Thus, the FTC’s enforcement has
focused primarily on cases where the injury—actual or potential—
is financial or physical. The same logic extends to federal and state
/05/14/what-is-cybersecurity-law/ [https://perma.cc/XXR5-27X6] (explaining
four basic topics of cybersecurity and components within each basic topic).
13
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (requiring that businesses
“[i]mplement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
appropriate to the nature of the information”).
14
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (creating a private cause of action for data
breach victims).
15
See, e.g., id. § 1030(a) (creating computer-related offenses).
16
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-AA (example of data breach
notification laws).
17
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11) (defining loss as “any reasonable cost to any
victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage
assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service”).
18
See id. § 1030(e)(8) (defining damage as “any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information”).
19
The CFAA does not define value, though throughout the statute, the value to
enhance an offense to a felony offense often includes loss of information valued
at $5,000 or more. See, e.g., id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii).
20
See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 613 (D.N.J.
2014) (“[T]he FTC’s . . . authority over data security can coexist with the existing
data-security regulatory scheme.”).
21
FTC, FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS (Dec. 17, 1980),
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness
[https://perma.cc/856U-ZLDF] [hereinafter FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON
UNFAIRNESS] (“Emotional impact and other more subjective types of harm, on the
other hand, will not ordinarily make a practice unfair.”).
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data security statutes, which require “reasonable” cybersecurity
measures to protect sensitive information of a financial22 or
medical23 nature.24
Finally, under data breach notification law, a company that has
fallen victim to a data breach may not even be required to disclose
the data breach if the company determines that the accessed
information does not qualify as “personal information” or if there is
no risk of financial harm to affected consumers.25 Moreover, even
when breached entities acknowledge a data breach and offer
assistance to their consumers, the tools offered to mitigate any
potential harm are often designed to address future financial harm.26
Credit monitoring, for example, is often provided at no cost to
consumers whose compromised information may put them at risk
for identity theft or financial fraud.27 This Article challenges this
approach to mitigating potential harm because the approach offers
22

See 16 C.F.R. § 313.3(n) (defining nonpublic personal information as part of
the Safeguards Rule as “(i) Personally identifiable financial information; and (ii)
Any list, description, or other grouping of consumers (and publicly available
information pertaining to them) that is derived using any personally identifiable
financial information that is not publicly available”).
23
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining protected health information for the
purposes of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act).
24
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (requiring that California businesses
implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices to protect
California residents’ “personal information”).
25
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.171(4)(c) (providing, as part of the Florida data
breach notification statutes, that “notice to the affected individuals is not required
if, after an appropriate investigation and consultation with relevant federal, state,
or local law enforcement agencies, the covered entity reasonably determines that
the breach has not and will not likely result in identity theft or any other financial
harm to the individuals whose personal information has been accessed.”).
26
See Robert Schoshinski, Equifax Data Breach: Pick Free Credit Monitoring,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jul. 31, 2019), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/
2019/07/equifax-data-breach-pick-free-credit-monitoring
[https://perma.cc/5MDA-9SDJ] (explaining that consumers may ask for Equifax
to provide them with complimentary credit monitoring as a result of a data
breach).
27
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93H § 3A (2019) (requiring that breached
entities provide affected residents with “credit monitoring services at no cost to
said resident for a period of not less than 18 months” under the Massachusetts
data breach notification statute).

8
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remedies that are insufficient for the needs and experiences of those
consumers suffering from emotional and mental conditions as a
result of a data breach. This approach currently pervades the entirety
of cybersecurity law.
The absence of psychological data breach harms within the
scope of cybersecurity law is not necessarily intentional.
Cybersecurity law largely evolved in an era where data breach
harms were believed to have involved only financial damage or
damage to computers.28 Only recently have the psychological harms
of data breaches surfaced and gained more attention from
researchers.29 Law and policy have lagged behind this revelation,
offering frameworks and solutions that have little to do with the true
extent of data breach harms.30 Undoubtedly, data breaches cause
harm to the entity suffering the breach.31 These harms include the
costs of responding to a data breach and mitigating its effect, such
as patching the vulnerability, training employees, disclosing the
breach, hiring forensic experts, and more.32 These mitigation
measures are all significant costs that the victim entity needs to

28
See The Morris Worm: 30 Years Since First Major Attack on the Internet,
FBI (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/morris-worm-30-yearssince-first-major-attack-on-internet-110218
[https://perma.cc/VPA9-FAYW]
(telling the story of the first known malware, the Morris Worm, which caused
damage to 6,000 out of the 60,000 computers that were then connected to the
internet and subsequently led to Morris Worm facing charges in 1989 under the
1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act).
29
See, e.g., Bada & Nurse, supra note 6, at 82 (surveying recent research
indicating that “cyberattacks can cause psychological impact.”).
30
See generally Jeff Kosseff, Hacking Cybersecurity Law, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV.
811, 813 (2020) (arguing for a complete overhaul and rethinking of cybersecurity
law).
31
DEREK BAMBAUER ET AL., CYBERSECURITY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY
PROBLEM 73, 73 (2021) (breaking up “technology risk” into four categories:
financial risk, operational risk, reputational risk, and legal risk).
32
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BREACH RESPONSE: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS
1–4 (2019) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0154_data-breach-response-guide-for-business-042519-508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7CGK-LWLW] (providing businesses with a roadmap for
breach response, the steps of which include: “secure your operations,” “fix
vulnerabilities,” and “notify appropriate parties”).
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account for during the breach, as well as in the post-breach phase.33
The fallout of data breaches also affects consumers, who experience
direct and indirect costs, such as financial theft, legal costs, credit
card monitoring costs, and more.34
However, these significant costs represent only part of the
societal problem regarding the fallout associated with a data breach.
Data breach harms can manifest in depression, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and other related conditions.
Additionally, those harms can be delayed, or can seem small,35
which could lead to consumers’ reluctance to make use of any
remedial tools offered to them. But most importantly, the current
unrecognition of psychological data breach harms means that
consumers have few tools to turn to once consumers experience
these harms. For example, counseling and social services aimed at
reducing and managing emotional and mental conditions resulting
from a data breach are currently not mandated by the law, and
breached entities generally do not offer counseling or social services
on their own initiative.36 Ultimately, these psychological harms, in
the aggregate, represent a major societal problem for which the law
does not offer any solutions.
Surely, consumers whose sensitive information was
compromised in a data breach may pursue litigation against the
breached entity, often in the form of a class action lawsuit that
33

Ping Wang et al., Economic Costs and Impacts and Business Data Breaches,
20 ISSUES INFO. SYS. 162, 165–66 (2019).
34
Id. at 166–67.
35
See Danielle Citron & Daniel Solove, Privacy Harms 3 (Geo. Wash. L. Sch.
Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Paper No. 2021-11) [hereinafter Citron & Solove,
Privacy Harms] (observing that privacy harms are small on the individual level
but are significant when considered in the aggregate).
36
Hugh Koch et al., Psychological Injury, Cyber Crime and Data Breach
Damages, THE EXPERT WITNESS (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.expertwitness
journal.co.uk/medico-legal/1098-psychological-injury-cyber-crime-and-databreach-damages [https://perma.cc/9VM7-PQEV] (“The immediate future for
these types of [psychological injury] claim should allow greater recognition and
support for individuals who have been placed in such invidious positions by data
breaches.”); see also Guynn, supra note 7 (“Employees were referred to shortterm counseling to help them cope, whether they were just rattled by the breach
or were overwhelmed unwinding the damage.”).
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consolidates the smaller harms.37 This course of action is not without
challenges. One such challenge is that plaintiffs must show actual
harm to satisfy both standing38 and cause of action requirements.39
In some jurisdictions, a certain likelihood of future financial harm
may suffice.40 However, courts have been reluctant to recognize
harms that are non-financial in nature, despite ample research
showing that consumers whose personal information was
compromised may suffer serious psychological harm.41 Courts are
deeply divided on the question of data breach harm in general. For
example, the landmark Supreme Court case Spokeo v. Robins did
little to clarify the standing elements in data breach cases.42 In
Spokeo, the plaintiff sued a website that offered information about
individuals, such as their contact details, marital status, and financial
details. The plaintiff argued that the website willfully violated the
Fair Credit Reporting Act. The Court held that, to satisfy the
constitutional Article III standing requirement, a “plaintiff must
have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be
redressed by favorable judicial decision.”43 The Court added that
such injury in fact must be “concrete and particularized” and “actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”44 In other words,
without an actual injury, a plaintiff would be unable to recover any
damages.

37

See Jeff Stone, Facebook Fails to Kill Class-Action Lawsuit Over Data
Breach, CYBERSCOOP (Jun. 24, 2019), https://www.cyberscoop.com/facebookclass-action-lawsuit-moves-forward/ [https://perma.cc/V9B5-QZXM].
38
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
39
See JEFF KOSSEFF, CYBERSECURITY LAW 73–97 (2d Ed., 2020) (listing the
common causes of action in data breach cases, including negligence, negligent
misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, invasion of
privacy, unjust enrichment, and state consumer protection laws).
40
See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks, 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010).
41
See, e.g., Gross, supra note 7, at 284 (“[T]he psychological effects of cyber
terrorism can be just as powerful as the real thing.”).
42
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546–48 (2016).
43
Id. at 1547.
44
Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992)).
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The Spokeo decision has not been particularly illuminating in the
context of data breach litigation; there is currently a split among
appellate courts on whether future harm or an increased risk of harm
can satisfy the standing requirement arising from Article III of the
U.S. Constitution.45 This split leads to an incoherence of the
prevailing standard with wide-ranging differences among circuit
courts.46 The problem is further exacerbated by the Supreme Court’s
denial of certiorari in a Ninth Circuit data breach case, Zappos.com
v. Stevens.47 The split reflects the worrisome state of cybersecurity
law when it comes to both future harms (either monetary or nonmonetary) and actual, psychological data breach harms.48
Litigation raises a plethora of challenges in this circuit-split
context and has been covered by some scholars.49 Moreover,
cybersecurity law scholarship is currently oversaturated with
research on data breach litigation.50 This Article, however,
contributes to legal scholarship by looking at other areas of
45

The DC, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits held that Article
III standing is satisfied when there is a risk of future cyber harm. See Attias v.
Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018);
In re: Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litigation, 846 F.3d 625 (3rd
Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 4728027 (6th Cir.
2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015);
Spokeo v. Robins, 867 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017); Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693
F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012). Compare with the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits
holding that mere risk of harm does not satisfy Article III standing, in: Whalen v.
Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 Fed. Appx. 89, 2017 WL 1556116 (2d Cir. 2017); Beck
v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. 137 S. Ct.
2307 (2017); In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017).
46
See e.g., supra note 45.
47
Zappos.com, Inc. v. Stevens, 139 S. Ct. 1373 (2019).
48
See generally Daniel Solove & Danielle Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory
of Data Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2018) [hereinafter, Solove & Citron,
Risk and Anxiety] (discussing courts’ reluctance to consider psychological and
future harms as too speculative).
49
Id.
50
See, e.g., David Opderbeck, Current Developments in Data Breach
Litigation: Article III Standing after Clapper, 67 S.C. L. REV. 599 (2016);
Caroline Cease, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of Data
Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395 (2014); Max Meglio, Embracing
Insecurity: Harm Reduction through a No-Fault Approach to Consumer Data
Breach Litigation, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1223 (2020).
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cybersecurity law, though occasional references to courts and
litigation will inevitably be made. Specifically, this Article focuses
on psychological data breach harms that have been ignored by the
rest of cybersecurity law, in both the pre-breach and pre-litigation
contexts.
Cybersecurity law, in its different frameworks, does not do
enough to address psychological data breach harms. A framework
for cybersecurity law should exist where psychological data breach
harms are recognized from the very outset—at the stage where
organizations are designing and implementing their cybersecurity
structures. As this Article shows, legislators, policymakers, and
courts currently approach data breach harms as purely financial in
nature and therefore misconstrue the emerging nature of the harm.
As many recent data breaches illustrate, the nature of data breach
harms is changing, and the focus on financial harms alone addresses
only part of the problem. Hackers that compromise sensitive
consumer information seek not only to monetize the data through
fraud but also to capitalize on the compromised data through other
means, some less documented than others. Some examples include
doxing, algorithm training, subjugation of users to experiments, and
more. Therefore, data breach harm should be understood as more
than mere financial harm. Taking this perspective would, in turn,
recalibrate the ways in which cybersecurity law applies before,
during, and after the breach.
This Article’s framework for psychological data breach harms is
based on three key assumptions. First, data breaches expose
consumers to emotional and mental harm. Second, data breaches
lead to loss of control over personal data. Third, data breaches
subjugate consumers to unknown harmful uses by wrongdoers.
These assumptions, which are well-founded in literature and
practice, challenge cybersecurity law’s approach, as cybersecurity
law fails to recognize psychological data breach harms within any
of its existing frameworks. The proposed framework also responds
to specific inadequacies in law and policy on the question of data
breach harm by looking at both statutory law and regulatory
approaches to data breaches. To be clear, this framework does not
argue for the inclusion of all harms in the category of cognizable,
litigable, enforceable injuries, but rather, argues that lawmakers,
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regulators, and courts should modify their approach to harm in the
context of data breaches. To achieve this goal, this Article’s
proposed framework offers a conceptual reform that, (1) embeds the
risk of psychological harm in the risk assessment stage, (2)
considers the scarcity of compromised information in addition to its
sensitivity, (3) expands the meaning of “personal information,” (4)
detaches psychological harm from data misuse, and (5)
distinguishes psychological harm from physical harm.
This Article offers a contribution to legal scholarship that has
not been fully addressed up to this point. So far, cybersecurity law
scholarship has focused primarily on the existence or likelihood of
financial harm and the ways to mitigate such harm. Some
scholarship has been published on mental harms, such as anxiety in
the litigation context,51 though a broader survey of cybersecurity law
as a whole has not yet been conducted. To a large extent, this lack
of scholarship is intuitive, since many harmful uses of compromised
data are just now becoming better understood and studied. This
Article dispels some of the dated misconceptions that have
confounded lawmakers, courts, and regulators in the context of
psychological data breach harms.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II introduces
psychological data breach harms. Part III defines cybersecurity law,
an area of law that is often misunderstood or conflated with privacy
law. Additionally, this definitional primer highlights the concept of
“harm” within these areas of cybersecurity law, which lacks the
proper robustness to deal with psychological data breach harms.
This Part fleshes out some of cybersecurity law’s current
inadequacies, to which the proposed framework responds. Part IV
offers a framework for cybersecurity law to address psychological
data breach harms, proposing a modification of existing concepts.
Accordingly, the proposed framework offers ways to rethink
psychological data breach harms.
II.
PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA BREACH HARMS
“Harm” is among the central concepts in law, broadly
understood as “[i]njury, loss, damage; material or tangible
51

Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 48, at 753.
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detriment.”52 In law, harms can be either tangible or intangible in
nature, though their recognition as recoverable or litigable harms
may vary depending on different factors, such as jurisdiction and the
harm’s nature and concreteness.53
Here, “psychological data breach harms” means those harms
that occur as a result of a cybersecurity incident involving personal
data. While breaches are most commonly understood as events that
involve the compromise of sensitive information, other types of
incidents qualify as data breaches even when no sensitive
information was accessed. Examples include a distributed denial-ofservice attack54 (“DDoS”) that overwhelms the target with bogus
requests or a ransomware attack that locks sensitive data out of the
owner’s or fiduciary’s reach.55 As Jeff Kosseff aptly observed, a
ransomware attack would not obligate the company “to warn
consumers or assist them with alternative arrangements, since
consumers did not suffer a breach of sensitive information.”56 In
other words, a data breach occurs whenever users lose control over
their personal information, whether due to theft or unavailability,
caused by DDoS, ransomware, and similar incidents.
Psychological data breach harms may arise as a result of a
sensitive information compromise, leading consumers to experience
mental and emotional conditions in relation to the unauthorized or
52

Harm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (“‘Concrete’ is not,
however, necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible.’ Although tangible injuries are
perhaps easier to recognize, we have confirmed in many of our previous cases that
intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.”).
54
Josh Fruhlinger, DDoS Explained: How Distributed Denial of Service
Attacks Are Evolving, CSO (Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.csoonline.com/
article/3222095/ddos-explained-how-denial-of-service-attacks-areevolving.html [https://perma.cc/NYG8-QKW2] (“A distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attack is when an attacker, or attackers, attempt to make it impossible for
a service to be delivered . . . Generally, these attacks work by drowning a system
with requests for data.”).
55
Sean Lyngaas, Ransomware Attacks Grow More Menacing During the
Pandemic, Creating Headaches in Health Sector, CYBERSCOOP (Nov. 4, 2020),
https://www.cyberscoop.com/health-care-ransomware-coronavirus-ryuk/
[https://perma.cc/HSP2-UMW3].
56
Kosseff, Hacking Cybersecurity Law, supra note 30, at 834.
53
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unknown future use of their personal information.57 In Danielle
Citron and Daniel Solove’s words, “the range of possible future
injuries is much more varied and could be anything in the typology
of privacy harms.”58 Moreover, psychological data breach harms
may also arise in cases where, for example, the cybersecurity
incident did not affect any personal information and instead solely
affected the availability of a critical service on which consumers
rely.59 In all of these events, the parties involved may experience
data breach harms, whether of a monetary nature (e.g., losses,
physical damage to infrastructure, repair expenses) or a nonmonetary nature (e.g., anxiety, fear, risk, confusion, depression,
humiliation, anger).60
As early as 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
recognized the capability of technology to cause mental and
emotional harm in their article, “The Right to Privacy.”61 As Warren
and Brandeis framed the issue, “modern enterprise and invention
have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental
pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily
injury.”62 In other words, harms of a psychological nature are on par
with physical bodily injuries. This observation should keep guiding
cybersecurity law in the era of psychological data breach harms.
Despite this recognition dating over a century ago, scholarship
to date has not fully addressed the concept or the scope of
psychological data breach harms. Understanding the full range of
harms surrounding a data breach and other cybersecurity incidents
is theoretically important and is of significant practical use for
lawmakers, regulators, and courts constantly seeking to not only
improve nationwide cybersecurity, but also remedy victims
suffering from the externalities of cybersecurity incidents. As a
57

See Bada & Nurse, supra note 6, at 82–83.
Citron & Solove, Privacy Harms, supra note 35, at 45.
59
See id. at 43 (noting that even loss of phone battery life and phone storage
resulting from unwanted calls and data transmission can have “consequential”
effects).
60
See, e.g., Bada & Nurse, supra note 6, at 74, 82, 89.
61
Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
62
Id. at 196.
58
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result, any institution seeking to either legislate, regulate, or
adjudicate a data breach matter would benefit from a broader
understanding of what harms are associated with such incidents,
particularly where such harms deviate from the traditional financial
harms recognized by the law presently, like identity theft and fraud.
The following subparts set the stage for the conceptualization of
psychological data breach harms. Commentators may disagree on
the precise contours of psychological data breach harms, as the
notion lends itself to competing interpretations. This Article does
not attempt to come up with an exhaustive definition of the concept
or develop a taxonomy.63 This Article does, however, examine the
nature of psychological data breach harms using existing research in
sociology, psychiatry, internet studies, and the law. By exploring the
nature of psychological data breach harms, this Article unveils
common themes surrounding the concept, which will prove helpful
for future legislative and regulatory endeavors.
A. Monetary Harm
To understand psychological data breach harms, one must first
acknowledge the role of monetary harms within the body of
cybersecurity law. Data breach harms can be either monetary or
non-monetary in nature, though cybersecurity law is predominantly
concerned with monetary cybersecurity harms. Cybersecurity law
does not generally recognize harms of a non-monetary nature,
evidenced primarily by the thresholds and metrics recognized by
cybersecurity law as authoritative in cybersecurity incidents.
But what constitutes a monetary data breach harm? At present,
the law is largely concerned with identity theft and financial fraud
resulting from the misuse of compromised personal information by
hackers or other wrongdoers.64 This focus is perhaps best
exemplified by the recent FTC settlement with Equifax, whose data

63

See generally Agrafiotis et al., supra note 7, at 1 (proposing a taxonomy for
data breach harms).
64
Jeff Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, 103 IOWA L. REV. 985, 1007–08
(2018) (“Courts and legislators often focus on the financial harm to individuals—
such as the consequences of identity theft—caused by data breaches.”).
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breach affected as many as 147 million people.65 In this settlement,
Equifax agreed to pay $575 million, of which $300 million formed
a fund to compensate consumers for credit or identity monitoring
services.66 The remaining $275 million covered penalties in fortyeight states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.67
In another data breach settlement, Yahoo! agreed to pay $117.5
million to provide to affected customers, among other things, credit
monitoring and identity protection services for up to two years.68 The
settlement fund also covered any out-of-pocket losses, including lost
time.69
Furthermore, data breach litigation is predominately financiallyoriented.70 This trend could be the result of a strict conceptualization
of Article III standing or the reluctance of courts, in general, to
remedy consumers for non-financial harm.71 In the Target data
breach litigation, for example, the plaintiffs argued that they
“incurred unauthorized charges; lost access to their accounts; and/or
were forced to pay sums such as late fees, card-replacement fees,
and credit monitoring costs because the hackers misused their
personal financial information.”72 The plaintiffs’ argument in Target
is reflective of typical data breach litigation, which often revolves
65

Equifax to Pay $575 Million as Part of Settlement with FTC, CFPB, and States
Related to 2017 Data Breach, FTC (July 22, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2019/07/equifax-pay-575-million-part-settlement-ftc-cfpb-statesrelated [https://perma.cc/T6UJ-FJMZ]; see also Judge Thrash, Order Granting Final
Approval of Settlement, Certifying Settlement Class, and Awarding Attorney’s Fees,
Expenses, and Service Awards, (Jan. 13, 2020) https://www.equifaxbreach
settlement.com/admin/services/connectedapps.cms.extensions/1.0.0.0/927686a8-44914976-bc7b-83cccaa34de0_1033_EFX_Final_Approval_Order_(1.13.2020).pdf
[https://perma.cc/9RCQ-AG4Z].
66
Equifax to Pay $575 Million, supra note 65.
67
Id.
68
YAHOO! INC. CUSTOMER DATA SEC. BREACH LITIG. SETTLEMENT,
https://yahoodatabreachsettlement.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZWX6-7LNS] (last
visited Aug. 18, 2021).
69
Id.
70
See Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, supra note 64.
71
Id. at 1007–08.
72
In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1158 (D.
Minn. 2014).
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around financial harms.73 This reality suggests a call to examine the
nature of psychological data breach harms, which are often excluded
from litigation or dismissed by courts.74
B. The Nature of Psychological Data Breach Harms
Increasingly, researchers from different disciplines have begun
to recognize the mental aspect of harm resulting from data breaches.
For example, Elias Aboujaoude, a Stanford professor of psychiatry
and behavioral sciences, recently published an academic paper,
which highlighted that personal data exposure might cause anxiety,
depression, and PTSD in people whose data had been
compromised.75
Similarly, Dr. Ryan Louie, in his talk at the RSA Conference in
2020, recognized that cybersecurity events may cause a plethora of
mental health conditions, such as “depression, anxiety, PTSD-like
symptoms, paranoia, and other issues.”76 Some research has also
shown that victims who experienced online fraud “consistently
reported emotional impact as more severe than financial impact
across all fraud types.”77 Many other examples in similar research
expose the often-ignored, non-monetary harms of cybersecurity
incidents.78
Indeed, consumers informed of a data breach that compromised
their most sensitive information have reported feeling “dizzy with
73

Sasha Romanosky, et al., Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation, 11
J. of Empirical Stud. 74, 86 (2014) (“[B]reaches appear less likely to be litigated
in federal court absent financial harm.”).
74
See, e.g., Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2019)
(dismissing the plaintiff’s allegation of psychological harm as insufficient “to
sustain their claims for negligence or negligence per se, fraud or constructive
fraud, or violation of the MCPA”).
75
Elias Aboujaoude, Protecting Privacy to Protect Mental Health: The New
Ethical
Imperative,
45
J. MED. ETHICS
604,
606
(2019),
https://jme.bmj.com/content/45/9/604.full [https://perma.cc/F3DL-M78P].
76
Ryan Louie, MD, PhD, Quick Look: #Psybersecurity: Mental Health Impact
of Cyberattacks, YOUTUBE (Feb. 17, 2020), https://youtu.be/JxGar7_2KLA
[https://perma.cc/M4RJ-UTSW].
77
David Modic & Ross Anderson, It’s All but The Crying: The Emotional and
Financial Impact of Internet Fraud, 13 IEEE SEC. & PRIV. 99, 102 (2015).
78
See, e.g., Bada & Nurse, supra note 6, at 85–88.
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shock.”79 Nearly 85% of affected consumers reported “disturbances
in their sleep habits, 77% reported increased stress levels, and nearly
64% said they had trouble concentrating. Aches, pains, headaches,
and cramps were symptoms for nearly 57%.”80 In the most extreme
cases, some consumers have reported suffering from depression,
anxiety, and PTSD.81 Further psychological research has confirmed
the prevalence of diagnosable mental disorders resulting from data
breaches, such as Major Depressive Disorder, Panic Disorder,
Agoraphobia, and more.82 Some other studies equate these
psychological consequences to those experienced by trauma
survivors or victims of home invasion or assault.83
One question to ask is: why are psychological data breach harms
rising at such an alarming rate in recent years? There are many
potential answers as to why these harms are occurring more often
than ever before. First, better data supports the existence of these
harms, particularly their likely disconnect from physical harms.
Researchers in psychology, psychiatry, sociology, cybersecurity,
and the law have all been reinforcing the notion that psychological
data breach harms are real and often neglected by society’s current
law and policy approach to cybersecurity. A critical mass of
research supports this assertion.84
Second, data collection practices in recent years may share the
blame for the statistical increase in psychological data breach harms.
Data collectors have expanded the scope and nature of consumer
data collected, using the maxim of “collect data first, ask questions

79

Guynn, supra note 7.
Id.
81
Id.
82
See Koch et al., supra note 36 (listing the diagnosable psychological injuries
experienced by victims of data breaches); see also Karen Reilly & Gráinne
Kirwan, Online Identity Theft, An Investigation of the Differences Between
Victims and Non-victims with Regard to Anxiety, Precautions and Uses of the
Internet, in CYBERPSYCHOLOGY AND NEW MEDIA: A THEMATIC READER
ACCOUNT 112, 112 (Andrew Power & Gráinne Kirwan eds., 2014) (showing
heightened levels of anxiety in victims of online identity theft).
83
EQUIFAX, A LASTING IMPACT: THE EMOTIONAL TOLL OF IDENTITY THEFT (2015).
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See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
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later.”85 It is therefore not only financial data that today’s online
platforms and services collect, but also other details, such as verbal,
biometric, and audiovisual data.86 This practice means that data
breach harms go beyond the costs of replacing one’s credit card or
subscribing to credit monitoring and identity protection services.
Moreover, some data that is prone to causing psychological data
breach harms is immutable and of an intimate nature; these data
include, among others, sexual orientation,87 HIV status,88 nudity,89
and private communications.90
Cybersecurity is a societal problem. In the words of the late Joel
Reidenberg, a leading authority on information security and privacy,
“[S]ociety as a whole has an important stake in the contours of the

85

Andrew Burt & Dan Geer, The End of Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/opinion/privacy-rights-securitybreaches.html [https://perma.cc/C7HF-ML4R] (characterizing the American data
protection system as “collect data first, ask questions later” where “American
technology companies disclose their privacy policies in a terms-of-service
statement, but these disclosures are often comically ambiguous and widely
misunderstood.”).
86
Vivian Ng & Catherine Kent, Smartphone Data Tracking Is More Than
Creepy – Here’s Why You Should Be Worried, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 7,
2018),
https://theconversation.com/smartphone-data-tracking-is-more-thancreepy-heres-why-you-should-be-worried-91110 [https://perma.cc/ER6E-LEJK]
(reporting that data collected by smartphones “can include our location, internet
search history, communications, social media activity, finances and biometric
data such as fingerprints or facial features. It can also include metadata—
information about the data—such as the time and recipient of a text message.”).
87
Kelvin Chan, Norway to Fine Dating App Grindr $11.7M Over Privacy
Breach, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 26, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/europedata-privacy-norway-12d34063d0c20acd0e7a55fc8a6dfe1d
[https://perma.cc/85ST-PWJ9].
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James Griffiths, HIV Status of Over 14,000 People Leaked Online, Singapore
Authorities Say, CNN (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/28/health/
hiv-status-data-leak-singapore-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/2MDU-8PQM].
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Lily Newman, Hacks, Nudes, and Breaches: It’s Been a Rough Month for
Dating Apps, WIRED (Feb. 15, 2019, 4:44 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/okcupid-dating-apps-hacks-breaches-security/ [https://perma.cc/3NGL-95L6].
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protection of personal information.”91 If one accepts that
psychological data breach harms are a societal problem, the next
inquiry is, what can the law do to alleviate this problem? After all,
psychological data breach harms can impose significant costs on
consumers in the form of suffering, counseling, medication, and
treatment; if no recovery is available, affected consumers inevitably
bear these costs.92 This problem can be tackled via four potential
angles. One approach is to let consumers absorb the cost under the
theory that this harm is an acceptable and common risk in the digital
world.93 The second approach is to allow private enforcement to deal
with the problem through private litigation initiated by affected
consumers; however, such private enforcement may only succeed in
limited jurisdictions. The remedy would usually be monetary
damages. The other two approaches, which are not as widely
explored, involve expanding the terminology of cybersecurity law
to allow for more regulatory oversight, and focusing on the breached
entity’s role in both preventing harm and responding to harm if the
harm were to materialize. The proposed framework in Part IV
involves both of the latter approaches.
C. Emerging Recognition of Psychological Data Breach Harms
Recently, law and policy scholars and experts have become
more vocal about the psychological risks that data breaches can

91

Joel Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J.
877, 882–83 (2003).
92
See Thomas Cotter, Damages for Noneconomic Harm in Intellectual
Property Law, 72 HASTINGS L.J. 1055, 1059 (2021) (“[N]oneconomic harm
sometimes results in quantifiable economic losses—a person suffering from
emotional distress, for example, may incur out-of-pocket expenses to treat her
condition; but if her distress is not a cognizable injury for the type of claim at
issue, she’s out of luck, despite the relative ease of quantifying these losses in
comparison with some of the economic losses for which damages routinely are
awarded.”).
93
See Lauren Scholz, Privacy Remedies, 94 IND. L.J. 653, 663 (2019)
(“Analysis of the harm is absent where courts seek to avoid analysis of
compensatory harms based on the theory that any disclosure of information
anywhere constitutes consent, obviating the potential for relief from the privacy
tort.”).
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cause.94 Scholars and other commentators have raised multiple
arguments concerning the urgent need to address psychological data
breach harms.95
First, regulators themselves have become somewhat more
transparent as to psychological data breach harms, though this
transparency has not translated into actual enforcement or regulation
yet.96 The FTC—the primary cybersecurity enforcement authority in
the United States—recently held an “Informational Injury
Workshop,”97 where panelists provided a variety of examples
including individuals who suffered serious mental or otherwise nonphysical harm as a result of a data breach that exposed their personal
information.98 The Workshop participants recognized that doxing
attacks can result in violence, physical threats, emotional harm, and
social isolation,99 and that disclosure of private information may
negatively affect consumers’ relationships with family, friends, and
coworkers.100 Nevertheless, very little has been done at the FTC or
elsewhere to address non-monetary harms regulatorily.
Second, many legal scholars have been increasingly cognizant
of the exclusion of psychological data breach harms from the ambit
of extant law and have therefore proposed a broadening of the
concept of harm in data breach lawsuits.101 Professors Daniel Solove
and Danielle Citron, in their article titled “Risk and Anxiety,” make
a compelling argument that courts ought to recognize these
psychological harms, such as the harm of anxiety—either in the
94

See Fed. Trade Comm’n, In the Matter of: Informational Injury Workshop,
FTC, (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events
/1256463/informational_injury_workshop_transcript_with_index_12-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G34E-Z6P2].
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See id.
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See id.
97
Id.
98
Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 94, at 32:3–7 (“[T]here are cyber harms that
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future or at present—as a cognizable harm for both Article III
standing and cause of action purposes.102 Solove and Citron laid an
important foundation for the evolving definition of “harm” in
cybersecurity law literature: rejecting the approach that most courts
take to cognizable harm in data breach litigation.103
Solove and Citron’s work specifically focuses on data breach
litigation, which is one of the many subareas of cybersecurity law.
This Article builds on Solove and Citron’s work by expanding their
proposal to other areas within the law of cybersecurity beyond
litigation—for example, computer crime law, data security law, data
breach notification law, and FTC regulation and enforcement.
Moreover, this Article also distinguishes itself from the work of
Solove and Citron by recognizing a broader subset of harms that
may occur as a result of a data breach—not solely the harm of
anxiety or increased risk but also harms of depression, PTSD, and
other conditions. This Article takes the view that psychological data
breach harms require a legal framework that both prevents
psychological data breach harms and responds to psychological data
breach harms when the harms occur.
In addition, George Ashenmacher in “Indignity: Redefining the
Harm Caused by Data Breaches,” has argued that data breach
victims suffer a violation of their dignity, even when no financial
harm or actual misuse of the breached information occurs.104
Ashenmacher, in the same vein as Solove and Citron, argues for a
broader understanding of data breach harms to include nonmonetary harms, such as harms against the autonomy, dignity, and
privacy of consumers.105
Following the same logic of expanding cybersecurity law’s
concepts, Jeff Kosseff in “Hacking Cybersecurity Law,” proposed
the adoption of seven principles for a more robust and effective
cybersecurity law doctrine.106 One of these principles is
102

Id. at 767.
Id. at 756.
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“comprehensive,” which recommends that cybersecurity law “focus
not just on financial harms, but [on] any threats to national security
or individual privacy or safety.”107 Kosseff suggested that “personal
information,” used in many cybersecurity statutes, should be
expanded to accommodate emerging harms and abuses that have
only recently surfaced, such as harms and abuses of autonomy,
privacy, well-being, and more.108 This Article makes a similar
proposal in the context of psychological data breach harms.
Part III explores cybersecurity law and the particular
frameworks that this Article will draw upon for its proposed
framework. For the purposes of this Article, the cybersecurity law
covered will include computer crime law, FTC enforcement, data
security law, and data breach notification law. These subareas form
the bulk of cybersecurity law, though additional categories could be
classified as cybersecurity law.
III.
CYBERSECURITY LAW: A PRIMER
While “cybersecurity law” is used in various contexts, the
precise definition of this legal field is far from settled.109 Different
definitions of cybersecurity law have been offered,110 but there is not
yet a settled, authoritative definition. In the abstract, cybersecurity
law is a somewhat nascent field of law that seeks to address a variety
of issues related to information security for computers, networks,
systems, data, and other technologies.111
Information security, as a technical field, seeks to protect a wide
variety of valuable “assets” pertaining to computer systems.112 These
assets can take the form of “hardware, software, data, people,
107
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processes, or combinations of these.”113 In order to do so,
information security focuses on three distinct properties: (1)
confidentiality, (2) integrity, and (3) availability.114 This “CIA
triad”115 is seen purely as an embodiment of the “engineering
properties of a system.”116
Confidentiality seeks to ensure that assets are only viewed by
authorized parties.117 For example, a student’s grades may only be
viewed by the student and other predetermined authorized users.118
A breach of confidentiality occurs when a third party, say the
student’s friend, gains unauthorized access to the system that stores
the grades and, by doing so, views the grades.119
Integrity refers to the “ability of a system to ensure that an asset
is modified only by authorized parties.”120 For instance, using the
previous example, only an authorized educator should be able to
modify a student’s grade if such modification is warranted. A breach
of integrity occurs when a third party, say the same friend of that

113
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without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . .
information from any protected computer.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2018).
120
C. PFLEEGER, S. PFLEEGER & MARGULIES, supra note 112, at 6.
114
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student, decides to add (or subtract) points from the student’s grades
in an unauthorized manner.121
And finally, availability pertains to the system’s ability to ensure
uninterrupted access to assets by authorized users.122 For example, a
student who wants to view a grade should be able to do so by
accessing the grading system. An availability incident occurs when
the notorious friend of that student decides once again to mess with
the system, such as by flooding it with bogus traffic that overwhelms
the system, which can only handle a limited amount of traffic at a
single point in time.
The CIA triad illustrates that “cyber security” is “not a single
problem, but rather a group of very different problems involving
various sets of threats, targets, and costs.”123 Cybersecurity law,
therefore, is a body of law that seeks to address some of these
problems, though with mixed aptitude and success.
While information security and cybersecurity are generally
synonymous, the latter is used more often in legal and policy
circles.124 Recently, scholars, policymakers, and practitioners have
started referring to the law and policy of information security as
“cybersecurity law.”125 The Congressional Research Service has
identified more than fifty statutes related to information security that
could be considered part of cybersecurity law.126 However,
121

See, e.g., United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1191 n.11 (11th Cir.
2011) (upholding defendant’s conviction under the Wire Fraud Statute, reasoning
that by changing his own and his friends’ grades, the defendant committed a
federal crime because “the University certainly has an intangible property interest
in the integrity of its grading system.”).
122
C. PFLEEGER, S. PFLEEGER & MARGULIES, supra note 112, at 6.
123
Jennifer A. Chandler, Security in Cyberspace: Combatting Distributed
Denial of Service Attacks, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 231, 233 (2004).
124
See Matwyshyn, supra note 116, at 1158 (“In essence, the term
‘cybersecurity’ is the consequence of a cultural divide between the two coasts:
‘cybersecurity’ is the Washington, D.C. legal rebranding for what Silicon Valley
veterans have historically usually called ‘infosec’ or simply ‘security.’”).
125
See, e.g., Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, supra note 64, at 987
(discussing lawmakers’ use of the term “cybersecurity law”).
126
ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING
TO CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW OF MAJOR ISSUES, CURRENT LAWS, AND
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 28 (2014).
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cybersecurity law may lend itself to multiple definitions127 and, as
noted above, does not have an authoritative definition.128 This
Article takes the view that, in general, cybersecurity law is
comprised of a patchwork of statutes and regulations that promote,
or ought to promote, “the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of public and private information, systems, and networks.”129
While this definition may seem desirable and complete,
cybersecurity law currently lacks a robust approach to psychological
data breach harm. The fact of cybersecurity law being a
patchwork—rather than a body of law representing a cohesive set of
policy priorities and values—may be a contributing factor to this
gap. This gap is also evidenced in the limited scope of the definition
of “personal information” adopted by cybersecurity law, which
“does little to address the very real integrity and availability
threats.”130
Despite the absence of a comprehensive approach to
cybersecurity harm, harm is nonetheless a critical concept in
cybersecurity law. Many issues of cybersecurity law are resolved
through either the existence or absence of harm, usually of monetary
nature.131 The following subparts provide an overview of areas in
cybersecurity law where the question of “harm” is consequential.
These areas include the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”),
FTC enforcement, and various data breach notification statutes.

127
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 12 (“If you look closely, though, there isn’t much
clarity about what ‘cybersecurity law’ actually means.”).
128
See FISCHER, supra note 126, at 1 n.1 (“Thus cybersecurity, a broad and
arguably somewhat fuzzy concept for which there is no consensus definition,
might best be described as measures intended to protect information systems—
including technology (such as devices, networks, and software), information, and
associated personnel—from diverse forms of attack.”) (emphasis omitted).
129
See Kosseff, Defining Cybersecurity Law, supra note 64, at 1010 (providing
a definition that goes further: “[T]hrough the use of forward-looking regulations
and incentives, with the goal of protecting individual rights and privacy, economic
interests, and national security.”).
130
Kosseff, Hacking Cybersecurity Law, supra note 30, at 834; see also
Kilovaty, supra note 109, at 91–92.
131
See Kosseff, Hacking Cybersecurity Law, supra note 30, at 836.
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A. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
The CFAA is the primary federal criminal statute that both
criminalizes certain computer-related activities and also creates a
private cause of action for victims of computer-related offenses.132
The CFAA prohibits seven computer-related acts: hacking to
commit espionage,133 hacking to obtain information,134 hacking a
federal government computer,135 hacking to commit fraud,136
hacking to commit damage,137 trafficking in passwords,138 and
threats of hacking.139 While the term “harm” is only used once in the
statute, other terms appear in the statute that focus on the existence
of a certain level of harm: information, value, damage, and loss.
1.

Information and Value as Harm
One of the main CFAA offenses is the act of unauthorized access
to obtain information.140 Whether a CFAA offense has been
committed revolves around the question of information access.
While courts have defined “information” in a variety of ways, the
statute itself offers little guidance on what counts as information.
Does the definition purely focus on financial information,
information related to national security, and other sensitive
information? Or is there room for information that is potentially
intimate and embarrassing?
Despite the lack of a clear understanding of what “information”
means, a person commits a CFAA offense whenever the person
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains” information from either a
U.S. government computer or a protected computer.141 The felony
132

See 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
See id. § 1030(a)(1).
134
See id. § 1030(a)(2).
135
See id. § 1030(a)(3).
136
See id. § 1030(a)(4).
137
See id. § 1030(a)(5).
138
See id. § 1030(a)(6).
139
See id. § 1030(a)(7).
140
Id. § 1030(a)(2).
141
Id. See also id. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (defining protected computer, among other
things, as “a computer . . . which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce or communication.”).
133
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enhancement portion of the statute provides metrics to assess
unauthorized access to information and thus provides some
guidance on what constitutes information. Specifically, the statute
indicates that a § 1030(a)(2) offense would become a felony if “the
value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000.”142
But how should we determine the value of information when the
information is of a non-financial nature? What if the information
accessed is of an intimate nature, such as the sexual orientation or
gender identities of consumers—the kind of information that does
not have a readily-available “value”? The answer is not particularly
clear. In United States v. Batti, the Sixth Circuit held that market
value is the primary metric used to determine the “value of the
information,” and where such market value is unascertainable, “any
reasonable method” is an appropriate alternative.143 In Batti, the
Court said, the “cost of production as a means to determine the value
of the information obtained” would be a reasonable method to
ascertain the market value of the information accessed.144 This
holding could open the door for juries to determine the value of
consumers’ harm on the basis of the psychological harm that may
have resulted from the consumers’ compromised information.
2.

Damage and Loss
The CFAA also makes it a criminal offense to cause damage and
loss to a protected computer.145 For example, the CFAA makes it an
offense to transmit malware or otherwise harmful code, which
intentionally causes damage.146 In addition, the CFAA criminalizes
unauthorized access to protected computers that “as a result of such
conduct . . . [causes] damage and loss.”147
The CFAA raises a “damage and loss to a protected computer”
misdemeanor offense to a felony offense in several cases: where the
loss (1) exceeds $5,000 in a one-year period, (2) involves the
modification or impairment of medical information, (3) causes
142

Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(iii).
See United States v. Batti, 631 F.3d 371, 374–78 (6th Cir. 2011).
144
Id. at 378.
145
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5).
146
See id. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
147
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(C) (emphasis added).
143
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physical injury, (4) threatens public health or safety, (5) damages a
U.S. government computer used in the administration of criminal
justice, or (6) damages at least ten protected computers in a given
year.148 The increase in the level of these offenses focuses on the
physical and monetary consequences resulting from the offense.
The CFAA defines both damage and loss, though those
definitions do not support an inclusion of non-monetary harms, such
as mental harms. The term “damage” is defined by purely technical
elements as “any impairment to the integrity or availability of data,
a program, a system, or information.”149 The term “loss” is defined
via a combination of technical and monetary elements as
[A]ny reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to
an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data,
program, system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and
any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred
because of interruption of service.150

Again, non-monetary losses and damage are not expressly included
in either of these two definitions.
3.

Private Cause of Action
The CFAA’s approach to computer misuse—not expressly
including non-monetary and non-physical harms from its
unauthorized access to information, and failing to address damage
or loss to protected computers offenses—is not limited to the
criminal portion of the statute. The CFAA recognizes a private cause
of action that victims of computer crime may take against
perpetrators, contingent on one of the felony increase factors listed
above.151 The CFAA recognizes a civil cause of action for “[a]ny
person who suffers damage or loss,”152 which could entitle that
person to “compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other
equitable relief,” depending on the damage or loss suffered.153

148

Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i).
Id. § 1030(e)(8).
150
Id. § 1030(e)(11).
151
Id. § 1030(g).
152
Id.
153
Id.
149
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Yet, following the CFAA’s logic on limiting the terms of art of
“damage” and “loss” to monetary and physical harms only, it is
unlikely that any psychological harm would be sufficient for a
private cause of action under the CFAA. In other words, a victim of
a computer offense may be unable to pursue the perpetrators of a
data breach and recover any remedy for psychological harm under
the CFAA due to the statute’s direct focus on solely the physical and
monetary elements of information, damage, and loss.
B. Federal Data Security Enforcement
The FTC is the primary enforcement authority on data security
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”).
Section 5 of the FTC Act makes unlawful any “[u]nfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce.”154 The FTC Act labels a
method of competition as unfair if it satisfies the three-part
unfairness test.155 The three-part unfairness test makes unfair an “act
or practice [that] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition.”156
The term “injury” in the unfairness test has not been clearly
defined by the FTC and therefore lends itself to multiple
interpretations.157 In a 1982 letter, FTC Chairman J.C. Miller iterated
the FTC’s interpretation that, “[a]s a general proposition, substantial
injury involves economic or monetary harm and does not cover
subjective examples of harm such as emotional distress or offenses

154

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
See id. § 45(n).
156
Id.
157
See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 639 (2014) (“Monetary, health, and
safety risks are common injuries considered ‘substantial,’ but trivial, speculative,
emotional, and ‘other more subjective types of harm’ are usually not considered
substantial for unfairness purposes.” (quoting Letter from FTC Comm’rs to
Wendell H. Ford & John C. Danforth, Senators (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in In
re Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070–76 (1984))).
155
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to taste or social belief.”158 Another FTC statement from 1980
supported a similar approach, that “[e]motional impact and other
more subjective types of harm . . . will not ordinarily make a practice
unfair.”159
These statements, however, should be taken with some caution.
The FTC opined on the place of emotional harm in its enforcement
actions decades before cybersecurity became a major societal
problem.160 The FTC recognized that “[i]n an extreme case, . . .
where tangible injury could be clearly demonstrated, emotional
effects might possibly be considered as the basis for a finding of
unfairness.”161 But, at present, the FTC has not indicated how it
might approach emotional and mental harms resulting from data
breaches in its enforcement actions. These harms have never formed
the basis for an enforcement action on their own. Additionally,
regardless of the FTC’s approach, courts and administrative law
judges are reluctant to recognize emotional harms as recoverable
damages.162
In enforcement, the FTC’s focus is on either those companies
whose data security practices are inadequate where some monetary
injury to consumers occurs or those instances when sensitive
medical information is compromised due to unreasonable data
security practices.163 For example, in the landmark Third Circuit case
of FTC v. Wyndham, the FTC alleged that consumers had suffered
and would suffer substantial injury as a result of a data security
compromise affecting 619,000 consumers with $10.6 million in
158
Letter from FTC Chairman J.C. Miller, III to Senator Packwood and Senator
Kasten (March 5, 1982), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 98-156, pt. 1, at 32 (1983).
159
FTC POLICY STATEMENT ON UNFAIRNESS, supra note 21.
160
See id. at n.16.
161
Id.
162
See e.g., LabMD Inc., No. 9357 (Initial Decision) (Nov. 13, 2015),
https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/151113labmd_decision.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YA7K-VQVN]) (“[T]he evidence fails to prove Complaint
Counsel’s contention that embarrassment or similar emotional harm is likely to
be suffered from the exposure of the 1718 File alone. Even if there were proof of
such harm, this would constitute only subjective or emotional harm that, under
the facts of this case, where there is no proof of other tangible injury, is not a
‘substantial injury’ within the meaning of Section 5(n).”).
163
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 157, at 639.
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fraud loss.164 Notably, the district court in the Wyndham case
asserted that “the Court is not convinced that non-monetary harm is,
as a matter of law, unsustainable under Section 5 of the FTC Act,”165
potentially leaving the door open for psychological harms to be
adjudicated in the future and remedied when proven. In LabMD v.
FTC, the FTC pursued enforcement against a medical laboratory
where an employee negligently shared sensitive health-related
consumer information on a peer-to-peer network.166 However, the
enforcement action in LabMD was more focused on the lack of
reasonable cybersecurity measures and potential harm to consumers
than on any embarrassment or loss of privacy.167
The FTC enforcement mechanism is a welcomed remedy but
suffers from a serious gap in relation to psychological harms. While
FTC enforcement may coincide with the existence of both monetary
and psychological harms to consumers, psychological harm alone is
usually insufficient for the FTC to get involved and pursue
enforcement.168 Some argue that this gap is the flaw of the “do no
harm” approach, which disregards the wrongfulness of a data
collection practice as long as no financial harm occurs.169 As was
observed by many commentators, the FTC’s approach “fails to
properly deal with opportunism.”170 In short, corporate data
opportunism allows companies to use consumer information in ways

164

FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2015).
FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 623 (D.N.J. 2014),
aff’d, 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
166
LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2018).
167
See id.
168
See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, A Duty of Loyalty for Privacy Law,
at 44 (drft., 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3642217
[https://perma.cc/UF-47-GLTN].
169
FED. TRADE COMM’N, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 2020 PRIVACY AND
DATA SECURITY UPDATE 1, 7 (2020), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-2020-privacy-data-securityupdate/20210524_privacy_and_data_security_annual_update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EPX8-VSPK] (“[T]he FTC is focused on protecting consumers
from the financial harm that occurs when bad actors mishandle personal
information.”).
170
Id.
165
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that disadvantage consumers.171 Therefore, the FTC enforcement
focus leaves a lot to be desired.
C. Data Security Regulation
The FTC Act serves as a general data security regulation,
requiring that organizations adopt reasonable data security
measures.172 Additionally, other data security regulations exist, both
on the federal173 and state levels.174 These data security statutes set
the minimum cybersecurity standards for organizations, either in
general or for a specific sector. Federally, for example, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) contains a
security rule, which applies to the healthcare sector, requiring that
every covered entity ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of “electronic protected health information.”175
Similarly, the financial sector is regulated by the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, which sets the data security standards for regulated
financial institutions.176
State data security statutes likewise set minimum cybersecurity
standards for organizations processing data of their state’s residents.
Generally, these statutes mandate “reasonable security procedures”
to protect “personal information.” Examples of states that take such
an approach are California,177 Colorado,178 Florida,179 Texas,180 and
171

See id. at 19.
FTC, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS (2015) (“Once you’ve
decided you have a legitimate business need to hold on to sensitive data, take
reasonable steps to keep it secure.”).
173
For a list of federal data security statutes, see ERIC FISCHER, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R42114, FEDERAL LAWS RELATING TO CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW OF
MAJOR ISSUES, CURRENT LAWS, AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION 62–71 (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42114.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY2B-VEPK].
174
For a list of state data security statutes, see NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS., DATA
SECURITY LAWS – PRIVATE SECTOR (May 29, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/data-securitylaws.aspx [https://perma.cc/VH9D-S6Z3].
175
45 C.F.R. § 164.302.
176
See 15 U.S.C. § 6801.
177
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5.
178
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-713 to 713.5.
179
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2).
180
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 521.052.
172
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several others.181 The definitions in these statutes are similar in their
focus on demographics and individuals’ plainly identifiable
information covered under the statutes’ mandates. There is little to
suggest that these statutes also focus on information that has the
potential of causing psychological harm to consumers affected by a
breach. For example, if the online chats on a dating site are
compromised, unless the chats contain personally identifiable
information, such as a social security number, a bank account
number, or a driver’s license number, it is hard to qualify such
information as “personal information,” despite the undisputed
psychological impact if this information is seen by others.
Just like data breach notification laws,182 data security statutes
have been designed to address threats to specific pieces of
information that qualify as “personal information.” Their mandate
is usually unnuanced, involving only broad concepts of
reasonableness and protection of personal information.183 State data
security statutes do not go beyond this mandate to address more
emerging cybersecurity threats with respect to consumer data.184 The
definitional flaw of “personal information” discussed in the next
subpart is equally applicable to both data security statutes and data
breach notification statutes.
D. Data Breach Notification Law
Data breach notification statutes mandate public disclosure
whenever an entity experiences a data breach.185 The specifics vary
from state to state, and every statute has its own definition of a data
breach that qualifies for disclosure.186
181

See NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS., supra note 174.
See discussion infra Part II.D.
183
See CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-713 to 713.5;
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 521.052.
184
See CAL CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-713 to 713.5;
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 521.052.
185
See Mark Verstraete & Tal Zarsky, Optimizing Breach Notification, 2021 U.
ILL. L. REV. 803, 805 (2021).
186
For a list of state data security statutes, see NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGS.,
SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (July 17, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/5E6L-S8Q5].
182
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In the context of psychological data breach harms, data breach
notification law suffers from two major flaws. The first flaw is
definitional—that is, the definitions of data breach and personal
information are often limited to financial information that will likely
be misused and cause financial harm.187 The second is risk-related,
where most state statutes mandate a risk of harm assessment, which
could absolve the breached entity from the reporting obligations in
cases where there is no risk of economic or financial harm, either
present or future.188 Both the definitional and risk-related flaws are
reflective of the omission of any information that may cause
emotional or mental harm. This includes any present or future
emotional or mental harm from the risk assessment methodology.
1.

The Definitional Flaw
State statutes define “data breach” and “personal information”
differently. In California, a breach notification is required whenever
a data breach involves information like social security numbers,
financial account numbers, medical information, health insurance
information, unique biometric data, and license plate numbers.189 In
addition, usernames and passwords allowing access to online
accounts similarly require a notification if compromised.190 In
general, this notification approach focuses on the sensitivity of the
compromised information and the potential that the information will
be abused for the financial benefit of the perpetrators.
As one commentator notes, data breach notification statutes do
not cover breaches that involve “information that could be used to
stalk, harass, or dox” consumers.191 Following the same logic, a
disclosure is not required when the compromised information is of
such nature that psychological harm to consumers is likely.192 While
personal information of a financial nature is very likely to also cause
187

See Verstraete & Zarsky, supra note 185, at 810 (“[I]n defining personal
information, most states merely address information linking names to social
security numbers, drivers’ license number, or financial account information (such
as bank account or credit card numbers).”).
188
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa.
189
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82.
190
Id.
191
Kosseff, Cybersecurity of the Person, supra note 108, at 358.
192
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.29, 1798.82.
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psychological harm, the latter is not exclusive to data breaches
involving personal financial information.
2.

The Risk-Related Flaw
Most data breach notification statutes have a risk of harm
exception, under which the breached entities are not required to
disclose a breach if the entity determines that there is no risk of harm
to consumers as a result of the breach.193 The risk of harm assessment
varies among states but often focuses on the likelihood of financial
and economic harms to consumers.194 The Florida statute, for
example, reads as follows: “Notice . . . is not required if . . . the
covered entity reasonably determines that the breach has not and
will not likely result in identity theft or any other financial harm to
the individuals whose personal information has been accessed.”195
Many other statutes have a similar approach.196
However, New York’s statute was recently amended to include
an explicit mention of emotional harm as part of the risk of harm
assessment.197 To date, this is the only statute acknowledging the
important role of emotional harm in these risk of harm assessments.
The New York statute reads: “Notice to affected persons . . . is not
required if the exposure . . . will not likely result in . . . financial
harm to the affected persons or emotional harm.”198
While only a partial solution, this statute certainly offers a more
robust approach to these harms. As discussed in Part IV below, such
inclusion of emotional harms in the risk of harm assessment is
desperately needed to tackle the emerging recognition of data breach
harms.

193

See FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, STATE DATA BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS
(Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2019/01/-/
media/files/insights/publications/2020/04/20mc28174-data-breach-chart041720.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M9W-CX3X] (comparing the different statutes
and their respective risk of harm analyses).
194
See id.
195
FLA. STAT. § 501.171(4)(c).
196
See FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 193 (comparing the different
statutes and their approaches to risk of harm).
197
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 899-aa(2)(a).
198
Id.
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E. The Shortcomings of Data Breach Litigation in the Context of
Psychological Harm
The body of data breach litigation forms an additional part of
cybersecurity law. Litigation may offer an important remedy to
consumers who suffer from a significant psychological data breach
harm, but litigation is only one tool in the cybersecurity law toolbox.
Therefore, for the reasons discussed below, data breach litigation is
not in and of itself a solution to the emergence of psychological
harms in data breaches. The following subparts briefly summarize
the shortcomings of data breach litigation in the context of
psychological harms.
1.

Litigation is Backward-Looking
This Article proposes solutions to address psychological data
breach harms largely from an ex-ante viewpoint; whereas, litigation
is, first and foremost, a legal process that comes after the fact, where
plaintiffs seek to recover damages in connection with a data breach.
Litigation, at least directly, does not prevent data breaches from
happening but can, of course, serve as a deterrent in the sense that
entities might be more cautious with personal consumer information
in order to avoid costly and publicized litigation resulting from a
data breach.
Addressing psychological data breach harms in litigation
requires their recognition within the process of cybersecurity
organizations. Forgoing the collection of information that could
cause psychological harm or protecting against those harms in the
same manner as financial harms is a critical change that needs to
take place. In addition, litigation does not usually affect the baseline
obligations that breached organizations need to have, such as
providing consumers with the proper resources, offering counseling
services, and, in general, informing consumers of their options.
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2.

Litigation is Unlikely to Succeed
Courts are reluctant to remedy harms of a non-monetary nature199
and are also less likely to remedy future harms.200 This reluctance
goes both to the Article III standing question, where plaintiffs must
show an injury in fact, and also to the merits, where courts are
simply more cautious when it comes to considering emotional and
mental harms.
The logic that informs courts to dismiss data breach lawsuits for
solely showing a hypothetical future harm is that there are too many
unknowns. As the Eleventh Circuit in Amburgy v. Express Scripts
stated, for the plaintiff to succeed in showing actual harm, “many
‘ifs’ would have to come to pass . . . ‘if’ his personal information
was compromised, and ‘if’ such information was obtained by an
unauthorized third party, and ‘if’ his identity was stolen as a result,
and ‘if’ the use of his stolen identity caused him harm.”201
Given this unfortunate reality, litigation is simply unlikely to
succeed in the context of psychological data breach harms. Such
harms may not be recoverable in most circuits, thereby making
litigation a suboptimal avenue for recovery. Data breach victims
aware of these difficulties generally avoid litigation since their
claims of psychological harm would likely not prevail under current
case law. Moreover, even where the harms litigated are of a financial
nature, class action lawsuits often result in a settlement that does
little to make the data breach victims better off.202
3.
Proposals to Address Risk and Anxiety as Cognizable Data
Breach Harms
Professors Solove and Citron have already proposed
recommendations for courts in adjudicating cases regarding data
breach harms,203 making the compelling argument that risk and
anxiety are no different than financial harms, and, therefore, courts
199

Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 48, at 753.
See, e.g., Tsao v. Captiva MVP Rest. Partners, LLC, 986 F.3d 1332, 1344
(11th Cir. 2021) (dismissing the lawsuit on the ground that the plaintiff’s future
harms were too speculative).
201
Amburgy v. Express Scripts, Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1053 (E.D. Mo. 2009).
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Citron & Solove, Privacy Harms, supra note 35, at 44.
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Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 48, at 773–78.
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ought to recognize these psychological harms as legitimate and
redressable harms.204 Their proposal is an important contribution to
the legal scholarship on psychological data breach harms yet is
largely confined to the area of data breach litigation. Solove and
Citron are aware of the imperfections of data breach litigation and
the likelihood that new legal tools would “work better.”205 Following
this logic, this Article shows the efficacy of additional legal tools
other than litigation. These legal tools include the other bodies of
cybersecurity law: computer crime law, FTC enforcement, data
security law, and data breach notification law, which all need to be
reimagined in order to cover psychological data breaches in the
realm of cybersecurity harms.
This Article will not reiterate the robust and comprehensive
proposals made by Solove and Citron, as well as others, on how data
breach litigation could realign itself with the reality of emotional and
mental harms. To fill the gap in the existing scholarship, this Article
addresses cybersecurity law outside of litigation.
IV.

A FRAMEWORK FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL DATA BREACH
HARMS
Cybersecurity law is overdue for reform to address the evolving
nature of data breach harms. Such reform must grapple with, among
other things, the inclusion of emotional and mental data breach
harms. This Article proposes a framework for the inclusion of the
psychological impact of data breaches in the process of
organizations’ cybersecurity structures, as well as within existing
statutory frameworks.
Privacy law scholarship has already begun addressing privacy
harms, which result from privacy violations rather than from data
breaches.206 The subparts that follow specify the contours of
204

Id.
Id. at 783 (“It is true that litigation is a flawed legal tool, but the other legal
tools to deal with data breaches have limitations. New legal tools might work
better.”).
206
See, e.g., Ignacio N. Cofone & Adriana Z. Robertson, Privacy Harms, 69
HASTINGS L.J. 1039, 1041–47 (2018); Ryan M. Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy
Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131 (2011); Matthew S. DeLuca, The Hunt for Privacy
Harms After Spokeo, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2439, 2440–52 (2018).
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psychological data breach harms by looking to the scholarship on
privacy harms, but first, a few words of caution.
A. Privacy ≠ Cybersecurity: Avoiding Privacy Conflation
Privacy law scholarship is years ahead of the scholarship of
cybersecurity. Privacy law scholarship offers certain lessons that are
valuable and applicable to cybersecurity law, depending on the
context. Strictly speaking, privacy law and cybersecurity law are
distinct areas of law, dealing with separate issues, actors,
motivations, and effects. However, there are certain conceptual
overlaps that may justify learning from the work of prominent
privacy law scholars.
The framework proposed by this Article is mindful of
cybersecurity law scholars’ inclination to conflate their area of
expertise with privacy law. This phenomenon is known as “privacy
conflation.”207 Privacy conflation refers to the tendency to put
cybersecurity in the same legal category as privacy.208 While privacy
is focused on protecting communications and de-identifying
personal information, cybersecurity relates to the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability (the “CIA triad” described above) of
computer systems and networks.209 Privacy law, for example,
addresses the mismatch between one’s expectation of privacy and
the actual use of one’s personal information by the data collector,
say, a social media platform.210 Cybersecurity law, on the other hand,
regulates the information security of computers, networks, data, and
systems against outside and inside threats and creates a legal
framework surrounding the consequences of a data breach.211
From a consumer point of view, there is a “substantial gap
between privacy- and security-related concerns . . . Internet users
recognize a difference between the two types of harms . . . [and] are
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Matwyshyn, supra note 116, at 1135.
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far more concerned about security-related concerns than privacyrelated concerns.”212
Regardless of the distinct nature of the two areas of law, privacy
law scholarship on privacy harms has a lot to offer on the topic of
non-monetary data breach harms. Privacy law addresses the
subjective and objective nature of such harm experienced by users
whose data has been compromised and its subsequent misuse. The
following two subparts apply the subjective and objective nature of
privacy harms to data breach harms.
B. Subjective Data Breach Harms
In “The Boundaries of Privacy Harm,” Ryan Calo categorizes
privacy harms into two groups: subjective and objective.213
Subjective privacy harm is the “perception of unwanted observation,
broadly defined.”214 To constitute harm, the observation must be
unwanted.215 In the realm of data breaches, an unwanted observation
by an unknown entity (an intruder) is a given.216 After all, a data
breach is by definition an unauthorized access to protected
information.217 Consumers have an implicit, and often explicit,
expectation that the personal information consumers share with a
trusted third party will not end up in the hands of outside hackers.218
In this context, subjective data breach harm is indeed a very
central part of psychological data breach harms. Consumers whose
information has been compromised in the past may feel a variety of
emotions and experience many mental conditions in situations
where their sensitive information is obtained by an unidentified
212

Gus Hurwitz, Privacy and Cybersecurity Are Not the Same, and Americans
Care Far More About Cybersecurity, AM. ENTER. INST. (July 2016),
https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Privacy-andSecurity.pdf?x91208 [https://perma.cc/E64L-HPLG].
213
Calo, supra note 206, at 1144–52.
214
Id. at 1144.
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Id.
216
See Solove & Citron, Risk and Anxiety, supra note 48, at 752 (“The motives
of those who obtained the data are unknown . . . It will not be clear who has the
data or what they will do with it.”).
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See id.
218
See Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy
Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 467 (2016).
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entity. This harm may be individualized, that is, stemming from a
given data breach, or systematic, where consumers experience these
effects given the prevalence and scope of intrusions taking place in
recent years.
Labeling psychological data breach harms as subjective is
critical. This categorization reflects the important notion that
psychological data breach harms can be experienced by affected
consumers without there having to be any subsequent action or
misuse beyond the initial data breach. Unfortunately, regulators and
courts have consistently declined to recognize the subjective nature
of these harms.219 Nonetheless, the subjective nature of these harms
does not make them any less real. Cybersecurity law should find
appropriate methods to address this subjective nature, some of
which are described in more detail in this Article’s proposed
framework below.
C. Objective Data Breach Harms
Many of the subjective data breach harms described above are
also objective, that is, having some “adverse, real-world
consequence.”220 Objective data breach harms are “external to the
victim,”221 in the sense that the harms involve an outside action with
regards to the information compromised in a data breach.
Wrongdoers may decide to use the compromised personal
information to engage in identity theft or financial fraud.222 In less
publicized cases, unauthorized actors may decide to purchase the
compromised data in bulk to perform doxing, microtargeting,
stalking, or other data processing with the view of monetary gain.223
The relationship between subjective and objective data breach
harms may not be self-evident. Yet, the objective data breach harm
219

See Scholz, supra note 93, at 656 (arguing in the context of privacy law,
Scholz asserts that “Courts’ concerns with privacy cases, though, run deeper than
the standing question. Courts worry that recognizing the privacy right in the
absence of a clearly defined concrete harm may lead to unpredictable, excessive
damages based on plaintiffs’ subjective perceptions.”).
220
Calo, supra note 206, at 1148.
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See id.
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See id. at 1148–49.
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is the factor that reinforces the subjective data breach harm that
consumers may experience—increased anxiety, depression, fear,
PTSD, and other conditions.224 In other words, there is an objective
psychological and emotional harm, but the objective emotional
harm is also a subjective harm experienced by the consumers
affected. Understanding this relationship may also explain the
overreliance of cybersecurity law on objective data breach harm,
which presumptively is easier to prove, as it is external to the victim
and involves more concrete evidence and quantifiable metrics. Both
subjective and objective aspects of psychological data breach harms
will be considered throughout the proposed framework that follows.
D. A Legal and Conceptual Framework for Psychological Data
Breach Harms
Psychological data breach harms are predominately subjective
in nature. They are experienced by the consumers affected
individually.225 Often, these consumers may be diagnosed with a
recognized mental condition, making the harm objective as well.226
Nonetheless, this subjective nature does not make psychological
data breach harms any less worthy of recognition. In this context,
the law is severely lagging. Cybersecurity law’s shortcoming is that
it is overly focused on objective data breach harms that can be
demonstrated with external evidence. The CFAA, FTC’s
regulations, data breach notification laws, and other statutes are
designed to respond to financial harms and unauthorized access to
valuable data.227
Private litigation and FTC enforcement play an important role in
potentially offering victims a remedy to psychological data breach
harms. However, as previously discussed, both private litigation and
FTC enforcement come after the fact and fail to address the
underlying data collection practices that are not sensitive to the
emotional and mental impact of the data collected if compromised.
In addition, private litigation and FTC enforcement presume a
224
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certain action, whereas there should be a substantial role for the
breached company itself in minimizing the non-monetary impact of
the breach experienced. Finally, both litigation and enforcement
have already been proposed by scholars as solutions to future harms.
This Article adds to existing scholarship by considering
subjective psychological data breach harms as mental health
implications that require a proper response, which is not litigation
per se. Cybersecurity law is designed to prevent, respond to, and
mitigate financial harms, but it ought to be redesigned to also
include the nuance of psychological data breach harms. There are
tools and methods to address harms of a psychological nature and
assist victims in dealing with and overcoming anxiety, depression,
fear, and PTSD associated with data breaches. The law already
recognizes the viability of some of these tools in the financial
context, but little has been said on their capacity to also address
psychological harms. This Article, therefore, proposes additional
methods of responding to these emerging data breach harms.
1.

Information Security Programs and Psychological Harms as Risks
The FTC requires companies that collect personal information
to adopt an information security program.228 An information security
program involves procedures, methods, tools, and rules to protect
the computers, network, data, and systems of the company.229 For
example, any company collecting sensitive consumer information is
expected to encrypt the sensitive part of the information,230 employ
an information security officer,231 train their employees on best
228

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS
2 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/start-security
-guide-business [https://perma.cc/TB83-Svv8].
229
See id.
230
See Thomas Pahl, Stick With Security: Store Sensitive Personal Information
Securely and Protect it During Transmission, FTC (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2017/08/stick-securitystore-sensitive-personal-information-securely [https://perma.cc/Q8WT-MU5B].
231
See William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REV.
1135, 1140 (2019) (“Developing a data security program requires considerable
judgment and expertise in both management and information technology (IT),
which is part of the reason so many responsible data custodians hire specialized
chief information security officers (CISOs) and similar leaders.”).
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practices,232 and audit policies periodically.233 There are differences
among different information security programs since companies
often have varying degrees of risk, sizes, data collection practices,
and sensitivity, as they “weigh costs and benefits, assess risk, and
invest accordingly.”234 In other words, every information security
program and cybersecurity policy is the result of a risk assessment.
Designing an organization’s cybersecurity approach is a result of a
risk assessment that looks to potential threats, as well as the value
of an organization’s assets.235 If the psychological impact of a data
compromise is unknown, the organization will likely not implement
the appropriate cybersecurity approach.
Turning to risk assessment: currently, risk assessment and
cybersecurity policies primarily focus on financial losses and
damage if a data compromise were to occur.236 Under this approach,
companies that assess their cybersecurity risk and develop policies
for data protection are neither required nor expected to quantify the
psychological risk of harm to consumers in the event of a breach. As
some commentators put it, a cybersecurity policy “often includes a
data classification regime or standard that categorizes data for
purposes of specifying which cybersecurity requirements apply to
particular data or system types.”237 At present, a robust system of
classifying consumer data, where such data is not of a financial or
medical nature, does not exist. Thus, is metadata protected? Should
only financial information be encrypted? Or should other categories
of information be encrypted as well?

232

Id. at 1187 (“Most of the frameworks expect data custodians to train
employees throughout the organization to ensure that they adhere to policy.”).
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Id. at 1187–88 (“Numerous frameworks call for continual risk assessment.
This effectively becomes a duty of ongoing monitoring. Some frameworks have
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Either not assessing the risk of psychological harm or ignoring
consumer data that could cause such harm within the internal
cybersecurity policy regime contributes to data breaches exposing
sensitive pieces of information about consumers, which enables the
loss of privacy and loss of control over consumers’ information, as
well as anxiety, depression, and other conditions. The same
approach is illustrative of how the psychological harm resulting
from data breaches can be traced back to the breached company
designing and reevaluating its information security program that
never accounted for such harm. The process of creating an
information security structure internally is simply devoid of an
assessment of risk of psychological harm, which puts consumers at
risk.
Changing a company’s understanding of what qualifies as an
informational risk could contribute to decreasing the risk of
psychological harm resulting from a data breach. Likewise,
changing what qualifies as an informational risk could also decrease
the likelihood of the company becoming a victim of a data breach,
though the implication of a better designed information security
program leads to a broader effect. For example, including the risk of
psychological harm as part of the risk assessment process could
better inform a company’s policies on data collection, retention,
protection, and use. It would affect the types of data collected by the
company and the data’s storage duration. If a company knows the
likely psychological impact of a certain category of information
getting compromised, the company is more likely to take the
security of such data more seriously from an information security
point of view. Thus, even if a breach were to occur, hackers would
not be able to easily access consumer information that is
embarrassing, private, or sensitive—albeit non-financial.
The FTC, in its Start with Security: A Guide for Business,
generally recommends that businesses avoid collecting personal
information that is not needed and that businesses hold on to
information only for as long as necessary.238 However, these
recommendations are tied to businesses creating an “unreasonable

238
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risk,”239 which is understood as involving consumers’ monetary and
financial risks. Involving psychological harm within the ambit of an
“unreasonable risk” would likely improve the overall data security
practices of the company in question. Additionally, including
psychological harm in “reasonable risk” would likely legitimize
regulatory enforcement, which is not as constrained by the same
harm requirements as courts.240
All in all, cybersecurity is the process by which organizations
try to protect their assets. This process mainly requires “regularly
auditing data assets and risk, minimizing data, implementing
technical, physical, and administrative safeguards, and creating and
following a data breach response plan.”241 Awareness of the
psychological impact of data breaches can better inform
organizations on the appropriate degree of security and the tools
necessary to protect consumer information even where such
information has no apparent financial or medical nature.
2.

Amending Cybersecurity Law: Recognizing Psychological Harm
As discussed earlier,242 data breach notification and data security
statutes suffer a major shortcoming in the context of psychological
harm. Most federal and state statutes regarding breach notification
and data security have a particularly narrow definition of “personal
information,” which typically serves as a threshold matter for
whether the statute applies.243 The concept of “personal information”
is unlikely to include all or most pieces of information that can cause
psychological harm, such as intimate details about consumers, the
compromise of which would result in mental distress.244
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See id. (“[B]y holding on to the information without a legitimate business
need, the FTC said BJ’s Wholesale Club created an unreasonable risk.”).
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In addition, in the context of data breach notification law, when
breached companies are evaluating whether a breach notification is
required, their “risk of harm” assessment does not include the risk
of psychological harm.245 Thus, even where personal information is
compromised, the breached company may still find a safe harbor if
the company reasonably determines that the compromised
information would not cause any financial harm to the consumers
affected. This outcome is true for all states that have a “risk of harm”
assessment in their statutes.246 New York’s statute is an important
exception, as its “risk of harm” assessment requires the
consideration of possible psychological harms.247
i.

Expanding “Personal Information”
Incorporating the risk of psychological harm requires a
reassessment of what constitutes “personal information.” Different
federal and state statutes on data breach notification and data
security contain their own definitions of personal information.248 All
fifty states’ data breach notification laws have their respective
definitions of “personal information,”249 as well as the Children’s
245
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-713 to
713.5; FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.052.
246
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 6-1-713 to
713.5; FLA. STAT. § 501.171(2); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 521.052.
247
See discussion infra Part IV.D.2.(iii).
248
See e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29.
249
See STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP, COMPARISON OF US STATE AND FEDERAL
SECURITY BREACH NOTIFICATION LAWS (Sept. 1, 2017), https://
www.steptoe.com/images/content/1/7/v2/172961/SteptoeDataBreachNotificationChart
.pdf [https://perma.cc/23B7-JZEU] (comparing all state breach notification laws
including, for example, California’s security breach notification law defining personally
identifiable information as:
[An] individual’s first name or first initial and last name in combination
with any one or more of the following data elements, when either the
name or the data elements are not encrypted:
(1) Social security number.
(2) Driver’s license number or California Identification Card number.
(3) Account number, credit or debit card number, in combination
with any required security code, access code, or password that would
permit access to an individual’s financial account.
(4) Medical information.
(5) Health insurance information.).
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Online Privacy Protection Act,250 Financial Modernization Act,251
Fair Credit Reporting Act,252 Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act,253 and the Privacy Act.254
This focus on financial harm is understandable, as these statutes
were enacted long before the existence of the critical mass of
research on psychological data breach harms present today. Some
other statutes, while enacted more recently, likewise do not bridge
the gap in failing to account for psychological data breach harm, as
the statutory language is largely duplicative.
However, in light of all the evidence surrounding psychological
data breach harms, the current approach—asking whether personal
information was accessed—can be problematic when simply
applied. Primarily, this approach might not include pieces of
information that could nonetheless be exploited and misused against
the data subjects and thus ignores the “many vectors of cyberattacks
that [could] harm individuals.”255 Such information can vary and
includes sexual orientation, nudity, metadata, contacts, private
communications, location, and more. This shortcoming is not to say
that the protection of personal information is not important for
society as a whole, but rather that data points that do not qualify as
“personal information” could nonetheless cause significant
psychological harm to consumers if compromised. Expanding what
constitutes “personal information,” or, at the very least, creating a
contextual and more flexible standard, is a desirable solution. As one
250

See 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8); 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (defining “personal
information” as “individually identifiable information about an individual
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address, contact information, Social Security Number, and more).
251
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See id. § 1681.
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See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2014) (defining “protected health information”
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See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (1974) (defining “record” as a combination of
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commentator aptly stated in the context of the “personal
information” approach’s inadequacy, “a thousand words are . . .
worth a picture.”256 Jeff Kosseff made a similar observation, noting
that such non-personal information “still may be quite sensitive and
valuable to identity thieves or other criminals, but the notification
rule does not apply.”257 Essentially, the “personal information”
approach represents a considerable gap.
An example where the law does accept a slightly more nuanced
approach to personal information can be found, surprisingly, in the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, where the Guidelines define
“personal information” as:
sensitive or private information involving an identifiable person
(including such information in the possession of a third party), including
(i) medical records; (ii) wills; (iii) diaries; (iv) private correspondence,
including email; (v) financial records; (vi) photographs of a sensitive or
private nature; or (vii) similar information.258

Furthermore, the United States Department of Justice Computer
Crime and Intellectual Property Section in the Criminal Division has
directed courts adjudicating CFAA cases that involve either “an
intent to obtain personal information, or . . . the unauthorized public
dissemination of information” to interpret “personal information” in
the same manner as the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.259
However, expanding the categories of personal information may
not be sufficient per se, as computer science has demonstrated the
capability to “reidentify” and “deanonymize” databases of
anonymized personal information.260 Essentially, society’s
256
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Crimes 139–40 (2nd ed. 2010) https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ccmanual.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8BDTPCJ] (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 2B1.1(b)(15)).
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See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010) (“Yet
reidentification science exposes the underlying promise made by these laws—that
anonymization protects privacy—as an empty one, as broken as the technologists’
promises. At the very least, lawmakers must reexamine every privacy law, asking
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understanding of what constitutes personal and non-personal,
encrypted and decrypted, anonymized and deanonymized is
immensely outdated. The peril in such anachronism is that a
considerable portion of current information privacy law is outdated
and dangerously ineffective, requiring a reexamination by
lawmakers;261 information that may seem unvaluable or
unintelligible may nonetheless be misused.
Some other scholars raised a similar concern, which is called the
“PII (Personal Identifiable Information) problem.”262 These scholars
have examined whether the “unstable category” of PII—adopted by
information privacy law—is flawed in the sense that information
privacy law limits the scope of what information is worthy of legal
protection.263 PII is not a category limited to just one statute; rather,
it is an overarching theme in all of information privacy and security
law, both on the federal and state levels.264 These scholars conclude
that the delineations of PII and non-PII should not be abandoned. To
achieve this end, they offer certain modifications to the PII
approach, which would consider PII on a continuum of
identifiability risk rather than a simple dichotomy, which the law in
its “personal information” approach currently favors.265
Indeed, expanding “personal information” is not solely aimed at
reforming data security and data breach notification statutes. Rather,
expanding the scope of “personal information” is a
reconceptualization of our thinking about assets worth protecting
and the efficacy of our current statutory frameworks. As an
additional example, while the CFAA does not use “personal
information” where it criminalizes computer-related offenses, the
CFAA’s use of “information,” “damage,” “loss,” and “value”
should nonetheless be scrutinized as too narrow or lacking in
whether the power of reidentification and fragility of anonymization have
thwarted their original designs.”).
261
Id.
262
Paul Schwartz & Daniel Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New
Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV 1814, 1815–
28 (2011).
263
Id. at 1816.
264
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265
Id. at 1879.

OCT. 2021]

Psychological Data Breach Harms

53

imagination.266 This suggestion is by no means a call to expand the
criminalization of computer-related activities, an approach that has
been criticized,267 but rather to ensure that the CFAA protects those
assets that society considers critical. Though some scholars, such as
Andrea Matwyshyn and Stephanie Pell, have been calling for the
narrowing of what qualifies as “harm” under the CFAA to only
“demonstrable technical harms experienced by a ‘protected
computer.’”268 Nonetheless, the psychological impact of data
breaches must be recognized under criminal law, and the CFAA
may seem an inappropriate vehicle for some due to its focus on
protected computers rather than the impact of hacking on
individuals. Subject to more research, it may be desirable to focus
on expanding cyberstalking and cyber harassment penalties to cover
some psychological data breach harms so that the intentional
infliction of significant emotional and psychological harm would be
penalized and deterred.
Society’s understanding of personal information, or information
worthy of protection, cannot be reliant on a fixed list of information
categories of a financial nature alone. A broader approach would
mean more flexibility in how companies and regulators understand
personal information at a given point in time. This would require
closely observing the trends of data misuse by unauthorized
individuals and organizations and a periodic readjustment of the
meaning of what information needs protection.
ii.

Scarcity Versus Sensitivity of Information Compromised
One way to approach the question of what qualifies as “personal
information” is to supplement the definition of information’s
sensitivity with information’s scarcity. Value, broadly speaking, is
derived, not only from the sensitivity (e.g., credit card number), but
also from the scarcity (e.g., sexual practices) of the information in

266
For the criticisms and list of reform proposals, see EFF, COMPUTER FRAUD AND
ABUSE ACT REFORM, https://www.eff.org/issues/cfaa [https://perma.cc/L743-6QHX].
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question.269 Given the current motives of hackers, billions of
sensitive records are available for purchase on the dark web, while
scarce information is not often seen as valuable or readily
exploitable.270 Andrea Matwyshyn argues that the value of
information in this day and age is derived primarily from its scarcity
rather than its sensitivity.271 This approach would transform the
definition of personal information from a demographic and financial
focus into a scarcity focus—how rare or secretive the compromised
information is.
The introduction of the “Internet of Things” into the legal
framework of cybersecurity could increase the importance of
scarcity in the evaluation of the information’s value. The “Internet
of Things” refers to the plethora of “smart” devices with embedded
sensors that collect information about their users and
surroundings.272 The growing number of “Internet of Things”
devices suggests that there are categories of information that the law
has not had the opportunity to fully consider and protect. Examples
of such categories include video recordings, sensor data, user
activity, temperature preference, physical activity data, driving
habits, and many more.273 As one legal scholar observes, the
compromising of “Internet of Things” sensor data does not at
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present trigger data breach notification laws.274 Given this
shortcoming, the argument goes that “sensor data are so sensitive
and revealing that consumers should be reassured that [their sensor
data] will not leak into the public sphere.”275 As legislators and
regulators reassess sensitivity from an economic harm perspective,
legislators and regulators should also consider scarcity, which can
provide a viable alternative with the view of protecting consumers
from psychological data breach harm, in particular where such
information is indeed scarce (i.e., collected by individual “Internet
of Things” devices).
While the data collected by the “Internet of Things” may
undoubtedly cause psychological harm if compromised, “Internet of
Things” data can also cause serious physical harm to consumers. For
example, a hacked pacemaker may cause significant bodily injury,
and in extreme cases, death.276 To respond to these harms, one legal
scholar proposes a torts regime for physical harms caused by
“Internet of Things” devices.277 The emerging challenges with the
“Internet of Things” ecosystem will likely require further research
on its psychological impacts and the potential liabilities that arise
from those impacts. In short, the data collected by the “Internet of
Things” has the potential to cause emotional and mental harm if
compromised.
However, psychological harms must be part of a broader
cybersecurity process. Scarcity alone can help determine the value
of information due to its rarity, as well as afford information all of
the equivalent protections as sensitivity, but scarcity does not tell the
whole story about the psychological harm when information is
compromised. Therefore, the scarcity approach must be
supplemented with a “Psychological Exploitability Assessment,”
discussed in the next subpart.
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iii.

Psychological Exploitability Assessment and Risk of Harm
Both the definitional flaw in data security law and the risk-based
flaw in data breach notification statutes require a change in approach
so that the law considers the nature of the protected or compromised
information. These two flaws can be remediated by assessing the
impact of collecting data that could mentally and emotionally affect
consumers if that data is accessed by hackers. “Impact” can be
understood using the National Institute for Standards and
Technology Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments, which defines
“impact” as the “harm that can be expected to result.”278 In order to
determine the impact of a potential or actual data breach on the
mental health of affected consumers, breached companies should
perform a Psychological Exploitability Assessment. This
assessment would focus on the expected psychological harm that
would result from a data breach. This assessment can apply both to
the question of “what information is being protected?” and to the
question of “is there a risk of harm?”
The Psychological Exploitability Assessment is a parallel
concept to the “risk of harm” assessment. Instead of assessing the
likelihood of financial harm to consumers affected by a data breach,
the breached company would look to the nature and scope of the
compromised information to determine how likely wrongdoers are
to exploit the information for blackmail, coercion, shaming,
exposure, and other objectionable uses of the breached information.
This assessment would determine: (1) whether a piece of
information that is not strictly within the ambit of “personal
information” should nonetheless be protected under the current
cybersecurity structure of the entity, and (2) if a breach does occur,
what the obligations are of the breached entity toward its consumers
(e.g., notification and remedies). The scope and nature of the
Psychological Exploitability Assessment will likely change from
time to time, as entities collect new categories of information, and
additional misuses of breached information surface and become
more widely recorded. Since cybersecurity is a process of
278
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responding to emerging threats, constantly reevaluating what
“psychological exploitability” means makes sense.
The basis of the Psychological Exploitability Assessment is that
of trust. Consumers trust data collectors to safeguard their data and
keep them safe from harm, whether physical, financial, or
psychological.279 As one legal scholar argues, “if we want to be
serious about safeguarding trust, more entities need to be
responsible for security, while the law must recognize broader
theories of harm, such as increased risk and anxiety.”280
Safeguarding trust and recognizing additional harms would involve
adopting the “mentality of data stewardship,”281 which requires that
entities protect data against new threats.
As mentioned above, New York law has made some
advancements on this front, though incomplete. The 2019
amendment to the New York data breach notification statute now
requires that breached companies consider emotional harms as part
of their risk of harm assessment. The statute reads:
Notice to affected persons under this section is not required if the
exposure of private information was an inadvertent disclosure by persons
authorized to access private information, and the person or business
reasonably determines such exposure will not likely result in misuse of
such information, or financial harm to the affected persons or emotional
harm.282

This statute reflects the only recognition of emotional harm in a
state data breach notification statute to date. As welcome as the New
York approach is to the risk of psychological harm, the statute does
not provide guidance on the circumstances where emotional harm
could be found.283 Accordingly, this lack of guidance serves as a
prime example of where a Psychological Exploitability Assessment
could assist both breached entities and regulators in determining the
279
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likelihood of emotional and mental harm in a given case. The
Psychological Exploitability Assessment would differ between
different organizations based on different factors. It would take into
account the type of the compromised data, the scope of the data,
digital forensic and other expert assessments on the likelihood and
nature of harms resulting from the breach, current and future trends
in data breaches, and more.
HIPAA is another example where non-financial harms have
been incorporated into the risk of harm assessment. In 2013, the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) considered a
rule that, under HIPAA, would have elevated an “incident” to the
level of a security breach of protected health information whenever
a breach posed “a significant risk of financial, reputational, or other
harm to the individual.”284 Under this view of harm, psychological
data breach harm to patients would support labeling an incident as a
security breach, thereby triggering all legal consequences under the
statute. This definition of “incident” also took the subjective
approach to viewing psychological data breach harms and has thus
been criticized by some scholars as overly focused on a subjective
standard.285 Eventually, the HHS reversed course and succumbed to
the criticism, offering a more objective standard for security
breaches.286 This unfortunate reversal is due to a misunderstanding
of the nature of psychological data breach harms in the legal and
regulatory sphere. In particular, the legal and regulatory sphere is
lagging behind current research indicating the unambiguous
psychological and emotional harms arising from data breaches.
Other legal systems have adopted an approach to breach
notification that reflects the logic underlying psychological
assessment. In Australia, data breach notification is mandatory when
the breach will likely cause serious harm to the affected

284
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consumers.287 Among the harms recognized is “serious
psychological harm.”288 Accordingly, whenever breached entities in
Australia are assessing their obligation under data breach
notification law, one of the harms under the risk of harm assessment
is “serious psychological harm.” This approach largely mirrors New
York’s recent amendment to its data breach notification law.
Overall, a Psychological Exploitability Assessment would take
into account not only the subjective nature of data breach harms, but
also their objective nature; therefore, criticism that focuses on the
general indeterminacy of subjective harms should not prevent the
implementation of this assessment. The Psychological
Exploitability Assessment should be informed by interdisciplinary
expertise on psychological harms: from psychologists, psychiatrists,
sociologists, lawyers, and information security professionals. By
utilizing experts, the Psychological Exploitability Assessment
would reduce the indeterminacy that many critics raise as a problem
to considering the subjective nature of data breach harms.
iv.

Detaching Psychological Data Breach Harm from Data Misuse
Conditioning the existence of psychological data breach harm
on whether there has been any data misuse conflates two different
questions and ignores the nature of psychological data breach harm.
When making such a determination, courts and regulators have
frequently reasoned that plaintiffs or victims cannot claim any
emotional or mental harm if there is no actual proof of data misuse.
For example, in Willey v. J.P. Morgan Chase,289 a district court held
that the plaintiff “ha[d] not alleged that his or any class member’s
information ha[d] actually been misused”290 and therefore, the
plaintiff’s
claims for expenses related to credit monitoring, anxiety, emotional
distress, and loss of privacy all [arose] due to the probability that his data
287
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might have been misused. Because this does not rise to the level of actual
damages, the state law claims fail to allege actual damages and must be
dismissed.291

The Willey court’s traditional approach to harm during data
breaches ignores the subjective and objective nature of
psychological data breach harms, which does not require actual data
misuse in order for victims to experience incredibly real and often
debilitating mental and emotional consequences.292
While actual data misuse may serve as a basis for a finding of a
plaintiff’s allegation of emotional and mental harm, actual data
misuse should not be a mandatory element that plaintiffs must prove
by introducing such a pleading. Courts and regulators should refocus
their analyses from requiring proof of data misuse to showing the
nature of the breached information and the potential misuses of the
compromised information, as well as providing expert testimony on
the plaintiffs’ psychological harms. As one commentator notes,
“there is a growing sense that individuals are harmed even where
their information has not been used to commit identity theft.”293 In
addition, another legal scholar argues that courts should actually
“permit liability at a much lower threshold of harm and fault or
blameworthiness,” an approach that conceptualizes cybersecurity
similarly to the principles of a contractual bargain.294
Whether data misuse has occurred should be a separate inquiry
from the preceding question of whether psychological data breach
harm exists. Data misuse can surely strengthen the overall evidence
that victimized consumers present, but data misuse should not be a
mandatory, prima facie element, especially where psychological
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harms are often caused merely by virtue of a data breach occurring,
which can be determined objectively.
v.

Isolating Psychological Harm from Physical Harm
Relatedly, requiring physical harm or a physical manifestation
of psychological harm, as a prerequisite for damages, ignores data
breach victims whose psychological harm is not accompanied by
any physical manifestations.
Some state laws require proof of a physical manifestation of
psychological harm in data breach cases. For example, in Nevada,
such proof is required and was demonstrated in Pruchnicki v.
Envision Healthcare Corp.295 In Pruchnicki, the district court noted
that Nevada law requires a plaintiff to “demonstrate that he or she
has suffered some physical manifestation of emotional distress in
order to support an award of emotional damages.”296 In denying the
plaintiff’s damages for emotional harm resulting from a data breach,
the Pruchnicki court cited the Nevada Supreme Court in Betsinger
v. D.R. Horton,297 which held that an emotional distress claim arising
from “a failed real estate and lending transaction” cannot survive
without “some physical manifestation of emotional distress.”298 This
approach—requiring proof of a physical harm—risks excluding data
breach victims, who suffer harm of a solely psychological nature.
The U.S. Supreme Court followed the same logic in Federal
Aviation Administration v. Cooper, which involved the mishandling
of medical records, whereby the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff needed to show “actual damages” under the federal Privacy
Act of 1974: that emotional distress alone was insufficient, even if
proven.299 The U.S. Supreme Court explained that “the Privacy Act
does not unequivocally authorize an award of damages for mental
or emotional distress.”300
295
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The U.S. Supreme Court’s approach is part of what Professors
Solove and Citron identified as a “cramped view of harm,” which
requires harm to be vested, that is, “already materialized in the here
and now.”301 “Plaintiffs must experience physical, monetary, or
property damage or, at least, the damage must be imminent.”302 In
the context of data breach harms, approaching psychological harms
through physical manifestations is problematic, as these harms
rarely have physical manifestations besides the breaches
themselves.303
A more appropriate approach for courts, regulators, and
companies is to treat psychological data breach harm as a separate
harm from any other physical manifestation of harm. In the 2015
United Kingdom case of Google v. Vidal-Hall,304 the U.K. Court of
Appeal adopted this “separated” approach. In Vidal-Hall, the
plaintiffs filed suit under the U.K. Data Protection Act of 1998
(“DPA”), arguing that, by invading their privacy and collecting
sensitive information, Google had caused them emotional distress.305
The Court, therefore, had to inquire whether the term “damage”
within the meaning of the statute included non-pecuniary damages,
such as emotional distress. By looking at the purpose of European
data protection legislation and interpreting the DPA, the Court
concluded that the law protects “privacy rather than economic
rights,” and therefore, the law compensates individuals whose data
privacy has been invaded by a data controller, which caused the
individual emotional distress.306 In effect, the Vidal-Hall decision
made the process easier for plaintiffs to bring suit with
compensation claims deriving solely from emotional and mental
301
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distress. Courts and regulators should conceptualize psychological
data breach harms similarly—in isolation from any physical
manifestation or pecuniary damages. Such an approach might lead
to an increase in case load, which is a systemic problem to be
addressed by legislators. However, the existence of harm and its
redressability is a separate issue that should be resolved by
individual courts.307
vi.

Rethinking Remedies for Psychological Data Breach Harms
The nature of psychological data breach harms offers an
opportunity to rethink remedies in the context of cybersecurity law.
Ensuring an appropriate remedy for informational harms has already
been proposed in privacy law scholarship. For example, in “Privacy
Harms,” Professors Citron and Solove identified three goals of
enforcement in privacy law: compensation, deterrence, and
equity.308 Citron and Solove have raised the concern that often, a
mismatch occurs between the goal of enforcement and the remedy
provided to victims. For example, the goal may be equity for a
specific situation, yet the only remedy available is monetary
compensation, which does little to address real and debilitating
psychological harm.
This concern regarding a mismatch between goals and remedies
also holds in cybersecurity law. Consumers who are psychologically
harmed as a result of a data breach may wish to secure monetary
compensation; however, cybersecurity law should consider broader
goals, such as equity and deterrence. The logic that cybersecurity
law enforcement goals should extend beyond monetary
compensation suggests that the law should make available other
remedies to harmed consumers.
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An example of an appropriate remedy in this context is
psychological counseling. Just as breached companies must provide
credit monitoring and identity protection services for a period of
time after a breach, breached companies should likewise be required
to compensate consumers with psychological data breach harms
through counseling that responds to the conditions the consumers
experienced. With some consumers, these conditions may arise
much later, but remedies should nonetheless be available, within a
reasonable amount of time.
Already, some companies offer “psychological first-aid” for
employees whose sensitive information has been compromised.309 In
addition, a group of insurance company Chief Risk Officers has
recognized “psychological support” as its own loss type, which
encompasses “assistance and psychological support to the victim
after a cyber [breach] event leading to the circulation of prejudicial
information on the policyholder without . . . consent.”310 Thus, the
cyber insurance industry may have a role to play in increasingly
recognizing coverage for costs associated with psychological data
breach harms.
Considering that psychological data breach harms are rampant,
deterrence should be one of the goals of cybersecurity law.
Accordingly, when the goal of liability is deterrence, the remedy
should be designed consonantly. However, who should be deterred
in this context? The answer may vary, but primarily, cybersecurity
law’s goal should center around the obligation of the data collector
to limit collection and implement procedures that internalize the
emotional and mental impact of any compromise of collected data.
Deterrence goes beyond the obligations of the data collector. For
example, any potential intruder should be deterred from using
compromised information to inflict psychological harm. The CFAA,
discussed in Part III.A., supra, creates certain thresholds like
“information,” “damage,” “loss,” and “value,” which ought to be
309
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interpreted as being protective of non-financial information that has
the potential to inflict psychological harm. An expansion of
“personal information” and the key thresholds in the CFAA would
likely have some deterrent power, though deterrence is not the sole
goal of cybersecurity law, as corporations must—first and
foremost—protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
their systems and data.
Overall, compensating the costs of psychological data breach
harms would be a good start. Compensation may be the direct
obligation of the breached organization to cover consumers’
expenses related to the breach. Alternatively, as some have
suggested, the creation of a “data breach compensation fund,”311
modeled after the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act’s Superfund, would cover the high
costs associated with psychological data breach harms.312 The data
breach compensation fund would “balance the high cost of lawsuits
with the aggregated psychological and economic harms to countless
individuals from data insecurity.”313
IV.
CONCLUSION
Cybersecurity law is currently designed to predominately
address financial harms resulting from data breaches. While there
are areas of cybersecurity law that have slightly broader approaches
to harm, psychological data breach harms are ignored by the
majority of cybersecurity law’s statutory and regulatory
frameworks. Research from psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and
cybersecurity on psychological data breach harms has shown how
devastating data breaches can be for consumers, yet law and policy
have failed to keep up with this overwhelming evidence.
This Article proposes a framework for cybersecurity law that
would afford more recognition and protection for information that
may inflict psychological harm on consumers, such as emotional
311
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and mental conditions, including anxiety, depression, and PTSD.
This proposed framework approaches cybersecurity as a process and
focuses on the evolving nature of harm, which requires a constant
revaluation and reassessment of what assets ought to be protected.
Rethinking cybersecurity law means reexamining key cybersecurity
terminology, adjusting the categories of information that require
protection, developing the appropriate remedies for psychological
data breach harms, and thinking about psychological data breach
harms in relation to data misuse and physical harms. This
framework is only the beginning, as newer techniques of
information abuse are likely to be introduced in the coming years.
Notably, the framework proposed in this Article revolves around
ensuring flexibility in the right areas of cybersecurity law and
therefore will offer the nimbleness required to respond to these
various new and emerging threats.
In the future, Congress and the States may need to draft new
legislation, and regulatory agencies may need to update their
guidelines and enforcement priorities. However, cybersecurity law
and policy, as it stands today, may nonetheless prove somewhat
effective to resolve the difficulties arising from data breaches that
create psychological data breach harms. The first step is to
acknowledge the psychological impact of data breaches and allow
this fact to inform existing cybersecurity law and policy, ultimately
resulting in a legal framework that holistically protects consumers’
psychological and emotional wellbeing from the consequences of
data breaches.

